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A Non-neutral Voting System and Preference Ranking
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/238494
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/2384947de6de30-f3a2-4837-817c-686789fce949
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
IPSJ-NL24261001.pdf (232.1 kB)
2026年8月27日からダウンロード可能です。
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Copyright (c) 2024 by the Information Processing Society of Japan
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| 非会員：¥660, IPSJ:学会員：¥330, NL:会員：¥0, DLIB:会員：¥0 | ||
| Item type | SIG Technical Reports(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2024-08-27 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | A Non-neutral Voting System and Preference Ranking | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| タイトル | A Non-neutral Voting System and Preference Ranking | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | 言語処理応用 | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| Information and Management Science, Faculty of Commerce, Otaru University of Commerce | ||||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| Center for Language Studies, Otaru University of Commerce | ||||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||||
| en | ||||||||||
| Information and Management Science, Faculty of Commerce, Otaru University of Commerce | ||||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||||
| en | ||||||||||
| Center for Language Studies, Otaru University of Commerce | ||||||||||
| 著者名 |
Akira, Kiryu
× Akira, Kiryu
× Sumiyo, Nishiguchi
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| 著者名(英) |
Akira, Kiryu
× Akira, Kiryu
× Sumiyo, Nishiguchi
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| 論文抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | We propose a new voting system, which is a mixture of Plurality Vote and Coombs' Rule. The procedure is as follows: first count the votes for the candidate who received the most votes, then count the votes for the candidate who received the fewest votes. For each candidate, subtract the number of votes for the last place from the number of votes for the first place and find the difference. The candidate with the highest value becomes the winner. The new system enables analyzing the languages involving ranking candidates such as: (1) I want A to B to C to D; (2) I prefer A to B to C to D; (3) A is better to B and B is better to C, or (4) I rank A behind B. When the voters have different opinions, the collective method aggregates individuals' preferences into a single choice, namely, (5) We want A. Such a system diagnoses the mass preferences and tendencies when people's rankings differ. | |||||||||
| 論文抄録(英) | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | We propose a new voting system, which is a mixture of Plurality Vote and Coombs' Rule. The procedure is as follows: first count the votes for the candidate who received the most votes, then count the votes for the candidate who received the fewest votes. For each candidate, subtract the number of votes for the last place from the number of votes for the first place and find the difference. The candidate with the highest value becomes the winner. The new system enables analyzing the languages involving ranking candidates such as: (1) I want A to B to C to D; (2) I prefer A to B to C to D; (3) A is better to B and B is better to C, or (4) I rank A behind B. When the voters have different opinions, the collective method aggregates individuals' preferences into a single choice, namely, (5) We want A. Such a system diagnoses the mass preferences and tendencies when people's rankings differ. | |||||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN10115061 | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
研究報告自然言語処理（NL） 巻 2024-NL-261, 号 1, p. 1-3, 発行日 2024-08-27 |
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| ISSN | ||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 2188-8779 | |||||||||
| Notice | ||||||||||
| SIG Technical Reports are nonrefereed and hence may later appear in any journals, conferences, symposia, etc. | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 出版者 | 情報処理学会 | |||||||||
