@techreport{oai:ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp:00238494, author = {Akira, Kiryu and Sumiyo, Nishiguchi and Akira, Kiryu and Sumiyo, Nishiguchi}, issue = {1}, month = {Aug}, note = {We propose a new voting system, which is a mixture of Plurality Vote and Coombs' Rule. The procedure is as follows: first count the votes for the candidate who received the most votes, then count the votes for the candidate who received the fewest votes. For each candidate, subtract the number of votes for the last place from the number of votes for the first place and find the difference. The candidate with the highest value becomes the winner. The new system enables analyzing the languages involving ranking candidates such as: (1) I want A to B to C to D; (2) I prefer A to B to C to D; (3) A is better to B and B is better to C, or (4) I rank A behind B. When the voters have different opinions, the collective method aggregates individuals' preferences into a single choice, namely, (5) We want A. Such a system diagnoses the mass preferences and tendencies when people's rankings differ., We propose a new voting system, which is a mixture of Plurality Vote and Coombs' Rule. The procedure is as follows: first count the votes for the candidate who received the most votes, then count the votes for the candidate who received the fewest votes. For each candidate, subtract the number of votes for the last place from the number of votes for the first place and find the difference. The candidate with the highest value becomes the winner. The new system enables analyzing the languages involving ranking candidates such as: (1) I want A to B to C to D; (2) I prefer A to B to C to D; (3) A is better to B and B is better to C, or (4) I rank A behind B. When the voters have different opinions, the collective method aggregates individuals' preferences into a single choice, namely, (5) We want A. Such a system diagnoses the mass preferences and tendencies when people's rankings differ.}, title = {A Non-neutral Voting System and Preference Ranking}, year = {2024} }