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A Decision Method in B2B E-Commerce Model based on Multi-Items Auction
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/82249
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/8224924333bd4-22ab-4680-962e-5e6cf1d2f6a9
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
IPSJ-JNL5305017 (325.8 kB)
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Copyright (c) 2012 by the Information Processing Society of Japan
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| オープンアクセス | ||
| Item type | Journal(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2012-05-15 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | A Decision Method in B2B E-Commerce Model based on Multi-Items Auction | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| タイトル | A Decision Method in B2B E-Commerce Model based on Multi-Items Auction | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | [Special Issue on Theory and Application of Intelligent Information Technology] procurement auction, B2B e-commerce, coalition making, auction protocol | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| Graduate School of Systems & Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba | ||||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| Graduate School of Science & Engineering, Yamagata University | ||||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||||
| en | ||||||||||
| Graduate School of Systems & Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba | ||||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||||
| en | ||||||||||
| Graduate School of Science & Engineering, Yamagata University | ||||||||||
| 著者名 |
Satoshi, Takahashi
× Satoshi, Takahashi
× Tokuro, Matsuo
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| 著者名(英) |
Satoshi, Takahashi
× Satoshi, Takahashi
× Tokuro, Matsuo
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| 論文抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper proposes a new B2B electronic commerce model from bidding information in double auctions. In B2B electronic commerce, buyers try to purchase multiple items at the same time, since a buyer develops something products by using purchased items. Also suppliers have an incentive of making coalitions, since buyers want to purchase multiple items in the model. A mechanism designer has to consider an optimal mechanism which calculates an optimal matching between buyers and suppliers. To find an optimal matching is very hard, since a mechanism calculates all combinations between buyers and suppliers. Consequently, we propose a calculation method which has two steps; first the mechanism determines winners of buyers' side, second the mechanism determines coalitions and winners of suppliers by using the result of buyers' side. This paper also discusses the improved method with dynamical mechanism design by using the bidding information. Advantages of this paper are that each d eveloper can procure the components to develop a certain item and tasks are allocated to suppliers effectively. The previous result of auction data can be available to shorten the period of winner determinations. Contribution of this paper includes two parts. One is creating a mathematical model of procurement auction, which is able to apply to practical situation. The other is proposing dynamic mechanism for the procurement auction. ------------------------------ This is a preprint of an article intended for publication Journal of Information Processing(JIP). This preprint should not be cited. This article should be cited as: Journal of Information Processing Vol.20(2012) No.3 (online) DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.20.649 ------------------------------ |
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| 論文抄録(英) | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper proposes a new B2B electronic commerce model from bidding information in double auctions. In B2B electronic commerce, buyers try to purchase multiple items at the same time, since a buyer develops something products by using purchased items. Also suppliers have an incentive of making coalitions, since buyers want to purchase multiple items in the model. A mechanism designer has to consider an optimal mechanism which calculates an optimal matching between buyers and suppliers. To find an optimal matching is very hard, since a mechanism calculates all combinations between buyers and suppliers. Consequently, we propose a calculation method which has two steps; first the mechanism determines winners of buyers' side, second the mechanism determines coalitions and winners of suppliers by using the result of buyers' side. This paper also discusses the improved method with dynamical mechanism design by using the bidding information. Advantages of this paper are that each d eveloper can procure the components to develop a certain item and tasks are allocated to suppliers effectively. The previous result of auction data can be available to shorten the period of winner determinations. Contribution of this paper includes two parts. One is creating a mathematical model of procurement auction, which is able to apply to practical situation. The other is proposing dynamic mechanism for the procurement auction. ------------------------------ This is a preprint of an article intended for publication Journal of Information Processing(JIP). This preprint should not be cited. This article should be cited as: Journal of Information Processing Vol.20(2012) No.3 (online) DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.20.649 ------------------------------ |
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| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN00116647 | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
情報処理学会論文誌 巻 53, 号 5, 発行日 2012-05-15 |
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| ISSN | ||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1882-7764 | |||||||||
