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A Second-price Sealed-bid Auction with Public Verifiability
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/11496
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/114961b8da8f6-0db4-4f2d-9e38-b1f300f68c9f
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
IPSJ-JNL4308005.pdf (219.1 kB)
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Copyright (c) 2002 by the Information Processing Society of Japan
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| オープンアクセス | ||
| Item type | Journal(1) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2002-08-15 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | A Second-price Sealed-bid Auction with Public Verifiability | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| タイトル | A Second-price Sealed-bid Auction with Public Verifiability | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | 特集：電子社会に向けたコンピュータセキュリティ技術 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||||
| その他タイトル | ||||||||
| その他のタイトル | 暗号プロトコル | |||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||
| Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology | ||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||
| Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology | ||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||
| en | ||||||||
| Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology | ||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||
| en | ||||||||
| Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology | ||||||||
| 著者名 |
Kazumasa, Omote
Atsuko, Miyaji
× Kazumasa, Omote Atsuko, Miyaji
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| 著者名(英) |
Kazumasa, Omote
Atsuko, Miyaji
× Kazumasa, Omote Atsuko, Miyaji
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| 論文抄録 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | A second-price sealed-bid auction is that wherea bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price.This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction.An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret.We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p0-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one. | |||||||
| 論文抄録(英) | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | A second-price sealed-bid auction is that wherea bidder who offers the highest price gets a good in the second highest price.This style of auction solves the problems of both an English auction and a first-price sealed-bid auction.An electronic first-price sealed-bid auction cannot directly be applied to a second-price sealed-bid auction which keeps the highest bid secret.We propose the verifiable discriminant function of the p0-th root. Our auction scheme satisfies public verifiability of auction results, and also does not have a single entity who knows the highest bid value even after an auction. Furthermore the bidding cost of our scheme is lower than that of the previous one. | |||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN00116647 | |||||||
| 書誌情報 |
情報処理学会論文誌 巻 43, 号 8, p. 1405-2413, 発行日 2002-08-15 |
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| ISSN | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1882-7764 | |||||||
