Group Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Shuttle Facility Games

• Item type: Journal(1)
• 公開日: 2020-12-15
• タイトル: Group Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Shuttle Facility Games
• タイトル / 言語: en
• タイトル: Group Strategy-proof Mechanisms for Shuttle Facility Games
• 言語: eng
• キーワード / 主題Scheme: Other
• キーワード / 主題: [特集：離散と計算の幾何・グラフ・ゲーム] mechanism design, transportation network, strategic agents, benefit ratio
• 資源タイプ / 資源タイプ識別子: http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
• 資源タイプ: journal article
• 著者所属: Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University
• 著者所属: Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University
• 著者所属: Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University
• 著者所属(英): en
• 著者所属(英): Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University
• 著者所属(英): en
• 著者所属(英): Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University
• 著者所属(英): en
• 著者所属(英): Department of Applied Mathematics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University
• 著者名: Yuhei, Fukui; Aleksandar, Shurbevski; Hiroshi, Nagamochi
• 著者名(英): Yuhei, Fukui; Aleksandar, Shurbevski; Hiroshi, Nagamochi
• 論文抄録 / 内容記述タイプ: Other
• 論文抄録 / 内容記述: We study the game-theoretical structure of a scenario where a decision maker has to determine locations of stations in a transportation system. We introduce a new model on facility games, called the “shuttle facility game.” A facility F is defined to be an interval with two stations over a transportation line. Then, the decision maker wishes to design a mechanism that given as input a set of intervals reported by each player, where Ii represents the commuting route of player i, determines a location for F. The profit of a facility location is defined based on the “convenience” to each player, such as the distance to the facility. A player i may try to manipulate the output of the mechanism by strategically misreporting Ii to get a higher profit. We formulate two shuttle facility games: the fixed-length and the flexible-length shuttle facility game; and prove that each admits a group strategy-proof mechanism. We prove that the social profit is also maximized by a location of F determined by our group strategy-proof mechanism, that is, a decision maker can find a location of F so that the social profit is maximized and group strategy-proofness is attained at the same time.; ------------------------------; This is a preprint of an article intended for publication Journal of; Information Processing(JIP). This preprint should not be cited. This; article should be cited as: Journal of Information Processing Vol.28(2020) (online); DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.28.976; ------------------------------
• 論文抄録(英) / 内容記述タイプ: Other
• 論文抄録(英) / 内容記述: We study the game-theoretical structure of a scenario where a decision maker has to determine locations of stations in a transportation system. We introduce a new model on facility games, called the “shuttle facility game.” A facility F is defined to be an interval with two stations over a transportation line. Then, the decision maker wishes to design a mechanism that given as input a set of intervals reported by each player, where Ii represents the commuting route of player i, determines a location for F. The profit of a facility location is defined based on the “convenience” to each player, such as the distance to the facility. A player i may try to manipulate the output of the mechanism by strategically misreporting Ii to get a higher profit. We formulate two shuttle facility games: the fixed-length and the flexible-length shuttle facility game; and prove that each admits a group strategy-proof mechanism. We prove that the social profit is also maximized by a location of F determined by our group strategy-proof mechanism, that is, a decision maker can find a location of F so that the social profit is maximized and group strategy-proofness is attained at the same time.; ------------------------------; This is a preprint of an article intended for publication Journal of; Information Processing(JIP). This preprint should not be cited. This; article should be cited as: Journal of Information Processing Vol.28(2020) (online); DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.2197/ipsjjip.28.976; ------------------------------
• 書誌レコードID / 収録物識別子タイプ: NCID
• 書誌レコードID / 収録物識別子: AN00116647
• 書誌情報: 情報処理学会論文誌; 巻 61, 号 12, 発行日 2020-12-15
• ISSN / 収録物識別子タイプ: ISSN
• ISSN / 収録物識別子: 1882-7764