@techreport{oai:ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp:00050122,
 author = {大田, 直樹 and 佐藤恭史 and 岩崎, 敦 and 横尾, 真 and Vincent, Conitzer and Naoki, OHTA and Yasufumi, SATO and Atsushi, IWASAKI and Makoto, YOKOO and Vincent, Conitzer},
 issue = {106(2007-ICS-149)},
 month = {Oct},
 note = {提携を組むことは，自動化された利己的な主体（エージェント）の持つ重要な性質であり，協力ゲーム理論では提携を結んだエージェントの集合が得た利得の分配法に関する研究を行っている．しかし協力ゲーム理論における既存の利得の分配法（解概念）はインターネットのような匿名の開環境の下においてエージェントが可能な不正操作に対し，脆弱である．そのため我々はそのような操作に頑健な解概念である匿名操作不可能コアを提案した．しかしこの解概念は膨大な計算量／表記量を必要とするといった問題がある．このため我々は匿名操作不可能シャプレイ値という新しい解概念を提案する．この解概念は匿名操作不可能コアより解の算出／表記が容易にできる．, Coalition formation is an important capability of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Recent research has revealed that traditional solution concepts are vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. To address the manipulations, a solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such manipulations, was developed. However, this solution concept is difficult to represent and calculate outcome functions in terms of computational complexity. To address these problems, we develop a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof shapley value. This solution concept is easy to represent / calculate the anonymity-proof shapley value.},
 title = {開環境での協力ゲームにおける公平な配分を実現する解概念の提案},
 year = {2007}
}