{"created":"2025-01-19T01:04:34.784298+00:00","updated":"2025-01-19T21:06:11.842674+00:00","metadata":{"_oai":{"id":"oai:ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp:00201304","sets":["6164:6165:6462:10022"]},"path":["10022"],"owner":"44499","recid":"201304","title":["サイバーリスク情報の非協力的な共有ゲーム"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2019-10-14"},"_buckets":{"deposit":"16f00e84-0b0c-45bb-a4d2-adf37fa32a30"},"_deposit":{"id":"201304","pid":{"type":"depid","value":"201304","revision_id":0},"owners":[44499],"status":"published","created_by":44499},"item_title":"サイバーリスク情報の非協力的な共有ゲーム","author_link":["491740","491737","491739","491738"],"item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"サイバーリスク情報の非協力的な共有ゲーム"},{"subitem_title":"Cyber Risk Information Sharing as a Non-Cooperative Game","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"cyber threat information sharing，Non-cooperative game theory","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_type_id":"18","publish_date":"2019-10-14","item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_18_text_3":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"NTTコミュニケーションズ株式会社／情報セキュリティ大学院大学"},{"subitem_text_value":"情報セキュリティ大学院大学"}]},"item_18_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"NTT Communications Corporation  /  Institute of Information Security","subitem_text_language":"en"},{"subitem_text_value":"Institute of Information Security","subitem_text_language":"en"}]},"item_publisher":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"情報処理学会","subitem_publisher_language":"ja"}]},"publish_status":"0","weko_shared_id":-1,"item_file_price":{"attribute_name":"Billing file","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"url":{"url":"https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/record/201304/files/IPSJCSS2019011.pdf","label":"IPSJCSS2019011.pdf"},"date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2021-10-14"}],"format":"application/pdf","billing":["billing_file"],"filename":"IPSJCSS2019011.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"542.0 kB"}],"mimetype":"application/pdf","priceinfo":[{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"660","billingrole":"5"},{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"330","billingrole":"6"},{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"0","billingrole":"30"},{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"0","billingrole":"46"},{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"0","billingrole":"44"}],"accessrole":"open_date","version_id":"325911e7-a229-4ab4-8e79-4e758a1cdf6b","displaytype":"detail","licensetype":"license_note","license_note":"Copyright (c) 2019 by the Information Processing Society of Japan"}]},"item_18_creator_5":{"attribute_name":"著者名","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"西野, 卓也"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"大久保, 隆夫"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_18_creator_6":{"attribute_name":"著者名(英)","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Takuya, Nishino","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Takao, Okubo","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_18_relation_9":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_relation_type_id":{"subitem_relation_type_select":"NCID","subitem_relation_type_id_text":"ISSN　1882-0840"}}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794","resourcetype":"conference paper"}]},"item_18_description_7":{"attribute_name":"論文抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"サイバー攻撃の観測は，攻撃者による攻撃手法の共有とみなすことができる．一方，攻撃者は攻撃対象が管理できていないサイバーリスク情報を保有することに関心があるため，自身の攻撃手法をなるべく秘匿したいと考えている．本研究では，非協力なプレイヤーによるサイバーリスク情報共有の戦略を，ゲーム理論的な解析が行えるポーカーのモデルに帰着できることを示す．また，その結果から，非協力的な情報共有戦略を分析できる「CRIホールデム」というセキュリティゲームを新たに提案する．","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_18_description_8":{"attribute_name":"論文抄録(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Monitoring of cyber attacks can be regarded as sharing of attack methods by attackers. In contrast, since the attackers are interested in holding cyber risk information that can not be managed by the defenders, They want to hide their attack methods as much as possible. In this paper, we show that game theoretic analysis can be performed on strategy of cyber risk information sharing by non-cooperative players.We also propose a game model called \"CRI Hold'em\" that can be used to analyze for cyber risk information sharing as a non-cooperative game.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_18_biblio_info_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicPageEnd":"83","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"コンピュータセキュリティシンポジウム2019論文集"}],"bibliographicPageStart":"77","bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2019-10-14","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"2019"}]},"relation_version_is_last":true,"weko_creator_id":"44499"},"id":201304,"links":{}}