{"created":"2025-07-09T02:57:18.222477+00:00","metadata":{"_oai":{"id":"oai:ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp:02003116","sets":["581:11839:11846"]},"path":["11846"],"owner":"80578","recid":"2003116","title":["ゲーム性向「金持ち喧嘩せず」は進化するか？：貯蓄とゲーム参加コストを付加した空間型囚人のジレンマゲームに観る複雑性の創発"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2025-07-15"},"_buckets":{"deposit":"50e46535-befc-465b-92e1-a0199fad5def"},"_deposit":{"id":"2003116","pid":{"type":"depid","value":"2003116","revision_id":0},"owner":"80578","owners":[80578],"status":"published","created_by":80578},"item_title":"ゲーム性向「金持ち喧嘩せず」は進化するか？：貯蓄とゲーム参加コストを付加した空間型囚人のジレンマゲームに観る複雑性の創発","author_link":[],"item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"ゲーム性向「金持ち喧嘩せず」は進化するか？：貯蓄とゲーム参加コストを付加した空間型囚人のジレンマゲームに観る複雑性の創発","subitem_title_language":"ja"},{"subitem_title":"Will the Game Propensity “Wealthier does not fight” Evolve?: The Emergence of Complexity in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with Resource-storing Mechanism and Game Participation Costs","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"[一般論文（推薦論文，特選論文）] 進化ゲーム理論，囚人のジレンマ，利得蓄積，ゲーム参加コスト，マルチエージェント","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_type_id":"2","publish_date":"2025-07-15","item_2_text_3":{"attribute_name":"著者所属","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"九州大学大学院総合理工学府／独立行政法人日本学術振興会"},{"subitem_text_value":"九州大学大学院総合理工学府"},{"subitem_text_value":"九州大学大学院総合理工学府／エム・アール・アイ リサーチアソシエイツ株式会社"},{"subitem_text_value":"ダッカ大学理学部数学科"},{"subitem_text_value":"九州大学大学院総合理工学府／九州大学総合理工学研究院環境工学部門"}]},"item_2_text_4":{"attribute_name":"著者所属(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University / Japan Society for the Promotion of Science","subitem_text_language":"en"},{"subitem_text_value":"Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University","subitem_text_language":"en"},{"subitem_text_value":"Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University / MRI Research Associates Inc.","subitem_text_language":"en"},{"subitem_text_value":"Department of Mathematics, University of Dhaka","subitem_text_language":"en"},{"subitem_text_value":"Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University / Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University","subitem_text_language":"en"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"control_number":"2003116","publish_status":"0","weko_shared_id":-1,"item_file_price":{"attribute_name":"Billing file","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"url":{"url":"https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/record/2003116/files/IPSJ-JNL6607001.pdf","label":"IPSJ-JNL6607001.pdf"},"date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2027-07-15"}],"format":"application/pdf","billing":["billing_file"],"filename":"IPSJ-JNL6607001.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"3.1 MB"}],"mimetype":"application/pdf","priceinfo":[{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"660","billingrole":"5"},{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"330","billingrole":"6"},{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"0","billingrole":"8"},{"tax":["include_tax"],"price":"0","billingrole":"44"}],"accessrole":"open_date","version_id":"e8564031-e24a-449a-bd85-b1aa1898467d","displaytype":"detail","licensetype":"license_note","license_note":"Copyright (c) 2025 by the Information Processing Society of Japan"}]},"item_2_creator_5":{"attribute_name":"著者名","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"内海,忍"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"晨,申"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"立川,雄一"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"ムハンマド ラジブ,アレフィン"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"谷本,潤"}]}]},"item_2_creator_6":{"attribute_name":"著者名(英)","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Shinobu Utsumi","creatorNameLang":"en"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Chen Shen","creatorNameLang":"en"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Yuichi Tatsukawa","creatorNameLang":"en"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Md. Rajib Arefin","creatorNameLang":"en"}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Jun Tanimoto","creatorNameLang":"en"}]}]},"item_2_source_id_9":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AN00116647","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501","resourcetype":"journal article"}]},"item_2_publisher_15":{"attribute_name":"公開者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"情報処理学会","subitem_publisher_language":"ja"}]},"item_2_source_id_11":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"1882-7764","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_2_description_7":{"attribute_name":"論文抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本研究では空間型囚人のジレンマゲームにおける標準的モデルに次の3点の拡張― (i)ゲーム参加コスト，(ii)利得の貯蓄機構，(iii)ゲーム性向；周囲よりも自身の総利得が大きい場合に次回のゲームへ参加するか否かを判断する機構―を付加し，通常の戦略更新に加えゲーム性向の更新も行う共進化モデルを構築した．これは，協調か裏切りかという対戦相手の表面的な行動の模倣にとどまらず，その裏に潜む相手の思考をも模倣する状況の再現を意図している．解析結果からは，モデル構造の単純さに比して，ネットワーク互恵の再現に特化した通常の空間型囚人ジレンマゲームでは観られない，大変豊かな複雑性の創発が観察された．本稿ではその中でも最も興味深い結果の1つである，「最終的には同じ協調率に行き着く場合であっても，貯蓄可能比率と参加コストの程度によって，その背後にある各個体が持つゲーム性向―金持ち喧嘩する，あるいは金持ち喧嘩しない―がまったく逆の方向に進化する」という事象に焦点を絞り，報告する．","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_2_description_8":{"attribute_name":"論文抄録(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This study adds the following three extensions to the standard model of spatial prisoner's dilemma games: (i) game participation cost, (ii) resource-storing mechanism, and (iii) game propensity; a mechanism to participate (or not participate) in the following game depends on their total gains. The model is based on a co-evolutionary model in which the game propensity is updated in addition to the usual strategy update. This model is intended to reproduce a situation in which the player imitates not only the opponent's superficial behavior (i.e., cooperation or defection) but also the opponent's underlying behind thoughts. The results of the multi-agent based analysis showed that a great deal of rich complexity emerged in contrast to the simplicity of the model structure. In this paper, we focus on and report one of the most interesting results; that is, even if the final coordination rate becomes the same level, the common sense of the entire group behind it―rich people likely fight or rich don't fight―evolves in completely different directions, depending on the resource-storing rate and the level of participation cost.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_2_biblio_info_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicPageEnd":"1010","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"情報処理学会論文誌"}],"bibliographicPageStart":"999","bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2025-07-15","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"7","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"66"}]},"relation_version_is_last":true,"item_2_identifier_registration":{"attribute_name":"ID登録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.20729/0002003116","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"weko_creator_id":"80578"},"id":2003116,"updated":"2025-08-01T07:47:48.968589+00:00","links":{}}