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  1. JIP
  2. Vol.21
  3. No.4

An Extensible Secure OS Architecture for Embedded Systems

https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/95722
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/95722
47b3bec9-918e-405b-b325-04fd33675c8c
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
IPSJ-JIP2104009.pdf IPSJ-JIP2104009.pdf (799.2 kB)
Copyright (c) 2013 by the Information Processing Society of Japan
オープンアクセス
Item type JInfP(1)
公開日 2013-10-15
タイトル
タイトル An Extensible Secure OS Architecture for Embedded Systems
タイトル
言語 en
タイトル An Extensible Secure OS Architecture for Embedded Systems
言語
言語 eng
キーワード
主題Scheme Other
主題 [Special Issue on Computer Security Technology for Enriching the Future] secure architecture, embedded systems, multi-core
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
資源タイプ journal article
著者所属
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者所属
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者所属
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者所属
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者所属(英)
en
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者所属(英)
en
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者所属(英)
en
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者所属(英)
en
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Waseda University
著者名 Ning, Li Yuki, Kinebuchi Hiromasa, Shimada Tatsuo, Nakajima

× Ning, Li Yuki, Kinebuchi Hiromasa, Shimada Tatsuo, Nakajima

Ning, Li
Yuki, Kinebuchi
Hiromasa, Shimada
Tatsuo, Nakajima

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著者名(英) Ning, Li Yuki, Kinebuchi Hiromasa, Shimada Tatsuo, Nakajima

× Ning, Li Yuki, Kinebuchi Hiromasa, Shimada Tatsuo, Nakajima

en Ning, Li
Yuki, Kinebuchi
Hiromasa, Shimada
Tatsuo, Nakajima

Search repository
論文抄録
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 Some recent researches have shown that using a monitoring service outside the target system above hypervisors is an efficient way to protect the target system. The hypervisors isolate the monitoring service based on MMU-methods to improve security. However, The MMU-method may cause heavy overhead when there is no hardware support, which makes this method not viable for embedded processors that are rarely equipped with hardware virtualization extensions. In addition, the vulnerabilities that exist in hypervisors may compromise the isolation. In this paper, we propose a secure OS architecture that fits embedded systems without the dependency of a hypervisor. It provides a robust isolation between the monitoring service and the guest OS based on local memory, a hardware feature. In order to generalize this architecture, we adopt a secure pager to extend the local memory space (physically small) virtually by a swap mechanism with integrity checking of the monitoring service. The secure pager can also update the monitoring service to extend monitoring functions without disturbing the running of the guest OS. Comprehensive evaluations are made in our framework with one instance of embedded Linux as the guest OS and an isolated monitoring service running with the secure pager. The results demonstrate functions of the secure pager and influence of the secure pager on Linux in our system. On processors with a proper architecture, we can build an extensible secure OS architecture with reasonable resource consumption, without the issue of heavy overhead to the guest OS.
論文抄録(英)
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 Some recent researches have shown that using a monitoring service outside the target system above hypervisors is an efficient way to protect the target system. The hypervisors isolate the monitoring service based on MMU-methods to improve security. However, The MMU-method may cause heavy overhead when there is no hardware support, which makes this method not viable for embedded processors that are rarely equipped with hardware virtualization extensions. In addition, the vulnerabilities that exist in hypervisors may compromise the isolation. In this paper, we propose a secure OS architecture that fits embedded systems without the dependency of a hypervisor. It provides a robust isolation between the monitoring service and the guest OS based on local memory, a hardware feature. In order to generalize this architecture, we adopt a secure pager to extend the local memory space (physically small) virtually by a swap mechanism with integrity checking of the monitoring service. The secure pager can also update the monitoring service to extend monitoring functions without disturbing the running of the guest OS. Comprehensive evaluations are made in our framework with one instance of embedded Linux as the guest OS and an isolated monitoring service running with the secure pager. The results demonstrate functions of the secure pager and influence of the secure pager on Linux in our system. On processors with a proper architecture, we can build an extensible secure OS architecture with reasonable resource consumption, without the issue of heavy overhead to the guest OS.
書誌レコードID
収録物識別子タイプ NCID
収録物識別子 AA00700121
書誌情報 Journal of information processing

巻 21, 号 4, p. 650-659, 発行日 2013-10-15
ISSN
収録物識別子タイプ ISSN
収録物識別子 1882-6652
出版者
言語 ja
出版者 情報処理学会
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Tatsuo, Nakajima, 2013: 情報処理学会, 650–659 p.

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