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Extending Bleichenbacher's Forgery Attack
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/9429
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/9429c7ccf623-c912-42d0-90bd-b30b543e016c
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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IPSJ-JNL4909002.pdf (257.7 kB)
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Copyright (c) 2008 by the Information Processing Society of Japan
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| オープンアクセス | ||
| Item type | Journal(1) | |||||||
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| 公開日 | 2008-09-15 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | Extending Bleichenbacher's Forgery Attack | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||
| タイトル | Extending Bleichenbacher's Forgery Attack | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||
| 主題 | 特集：安心・安全な社会基盤を実現するコンピュータセキュリティ技術 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | journal article | |||||||
| その他タイトル | ||||||||
| その他のタイトル | セキュリティ基盤技術 | |||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||
| FUJITSU LABORATORIES Ltd. | ||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||
| FUJITSU LABORATORIES Ltd. | ||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||
| FUJITSU LABORATORIES Ltd. | ||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||
| en | ||||||||
| FUJITSU LABORATORIES Ltd. | ||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||
| en | ||||||||
| FUJITSU LABORATORIES Ltd. | ||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||
| en | ||||||||
| FUJITSU LABORATORIES Ltd. | ||||||||
| 著者名 |
Tetsuya, Izu
× Tetsuya, Izu
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| 著者名(英) |
Tetsuya, Izu
× Tetsuya, Izu
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| 論文抄録 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | In 2006 Bleichenbacher presented a new forgery attack against the signature scheme RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. The attack allows an adversary to forge a signature on almost arbitrary messages if an implementation is not proper. Since the example was only limited to the case when the public exponent is 3 and the bit-length of the public composite is 3 072 the potential threat is not known. This paper analyzes Bleichenbacher's forgery attack and shows applicable composite sizes for given exponents. Moreover we extend Bleichenbacher's attack and show that when 1 024-bit composite and the public exponent 3 are used the extended attack succeeds the forgery with the probability 2<sup>-16.6</sup>. | |||||||
| 論文抄録(英) | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | In 2006, Bleichenbacher presented a new forgery attack against the signature scheme RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. The attack allows an adversary to forge a signature on almost arbitrary messages, if an implementation is not proper. Since the example was only limited to the case when the public exponent is 3 and the bit-length of the public composite is 3,072, the potential threat is not known. This paper analyzes Bleichenbacher's forgery attack and shows applicable composite sizes for given exponents. Moreover, we extend Bleichenbacher's attack and show that when 1,024-bit composite and the public exponent 3 are used, the extended attack succeeds the forgery with the probability 2<sup>-16.6</sup>. | |||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN00116647 | |||||||
| 書誌情報 |
情報処理学会論文誌 巻 49, 号 9, p. 2943-2950, 発行日 2008-09-15 |
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| ISSN | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1882-7764 | |||||||
