Side Channel Attacks on Message Authentication Codes

• Item type: Journal(1)
• 公開日: 2006-08-15
• タイトル: Side Channel Attacks on Message Authentication Codes
• タイトル / 言語: en
• タイトル: Side Channel Attacks on Message Authentication Codes
• 言語: eng
• キーワード / 主題Scheme: Other
• キーワード / 主題: 特集：ユビキタス社会を支えるコンピュータセキュリティ技術
• 資源タイプ / 資源タイプ識別子: http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
• 資源タイプ: journal article
• 著者所属: Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory
• 著者所属: Dept. of Computational Science and Engineering, Nagoya University
• 著者所属(英): en
• 著者所属(英): Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory
• 著者所属(英): en
• 著者所属(英): Dept. of Computational Science and Engineering, Nagoya University
• 著者名: Katsuyuki, Okeya; Tetsu, Iwata
• 著者名(英): Katsuyuki, Okeya; Tetsu, Iwata
• 論文抄録 / 内容記述タイプ: Other
• 論文抄録 / 内容記述: Side channel attacks are a serious menace to embedded devices with cryptographic applications, which are utilized in sensor and ad hoc networks. In this paper, we discuss how side channel attacks can be applied against message authentication codes, even if the countermeasures are taken to protect the underlying block cipher. In particular, we show that EMAC, OMAC, and PMAC are vulnerable to our attacks. We also point out that our attacks can be applied against RMAC, TMAC, and XCBC. Based on simple power analysis, we show that several key bits can be extracted, and based on differential power analysis, we present a selective forgery against these MACs. Our results suggest that protecting block ciphers against side channel attacks is insufficient, and countermeasures are needed for MACs as well.
• 論文抄録(英) / 内容記述タイプ: Other
• 論文抄録(英) / 内容記述: Side channel attacks are a serious menace to embedded devices with cryptographic applications, which are utilized in sensor and ad hoc networks. In this paper, we discuss how side channel attacks can be applied against message authentication codes, even if the countermeasures are taken to protect the underlying block cipher. In particular, we show that EMAC, OMAC, and PMAC are vulnerable to our attacks. We also point out that our attacks can be applied against RMAC, TMAC, and XCBC. Based on simple power analysis, we show that several key bits can be extracted, and based on differential power analysis, we present a selective forgery against these MACs. Our results suggest that protecting block ciphers against side channel attacks is insufficient, and countermeasures are needed for MACs as well.
• 書誌レコードID / 収録物識別子タイプ: NCID
• 書誌レコードID / 収録物識別子: AN00116647
• 書誌情報: 情報処理学会論文誌; 巻 47, 号 8, p. 2571-2581, 発行日 2006-08-15
• ISSN / 収録物識別子タイプ: ISSN
• ISSN / 収録物識別子: 1882-7764