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Algebraic Attacks on RAIN and AIM Using Equivalent Representations
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/228679
https://ipsj.ixsq.nii.ac.jp/records/2286792e3bae61-8386-474e-840a-6b96f3f13a4f
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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IPSJ-CSS2023066.pdf (225.4 kB)
2025年10月23日からダウンロード可能です。
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Copyright (c) 2023 by the Information Processing Society of Japan
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| 非会員：¥660, IPSJ:学会員：¥330, CSEC:会員：¥0, SPT:会員：¥0, DLIB:会員：¥0 | ||
| Item type | Symposium(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2023-10-23 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Algebraic Attacks on RAIN and AIM Using Equivalent Representations | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| タイトル | Algebraic Attacks on RAIN and AIM Using Equivalent Representations | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | conference paper | |||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| 東京工業大学 | ||||||||||
| 著者所属 | ||||||||||
| Eindhoven University of Technology | ||||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||||
| en | ||||||||||
| Tokyo Institute of Technology | ||||||||||
| 著者所属(英) | ||||||||||
| en | ||||||||||
| Eindhoven University of Technology | ||||||||||
| 著者名 |
Fukang, Liu
× Fukang, Liu
× Mohammad, Mahzoun
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| 著者名(英) |
Fukang, Liu
× Fukang, Liu
× Mohammad, Mahzoun
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| 論文抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | In this paper, we target the MPC-friendly ciphers AIM and RAIN used for the post-quantum signature schemes AIMer (CCS 2023 and NIST PQC Round 1 Additional Signatures) and Rainer (CCS 2022), respectively. Specifically, we could find nontrivial low-degree equivalent representations of the 2-round RAIN and the full-round AIM, respectively. Consequently, we could break 2-round RAIN with the 128/192/256-bit key in only 2{116} / 2{171} / 2{224} bit operations. For the full-round AIM with the 128/192/256-bit key, we could break them in 2{136.2} / 2{200.7} / 2{265} bit operations, which are equivalent to about 2{115} / 2{178} / 2{241} calls of the underlying primitive. | |||||||||
| 論文抄録(英) | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | In this paper, we target the MPC-friendly ciphers AIM and RAIN used for the post-quantum signature schemes AIMer (CCS 2023 and NIST PQC Round 1 Additional Signatures) and Rainer (CCS 2022), respectively. Specifically, we could find nontrivial low-degree equivalent representations of the 2-round RAIN and the full-round AIM, respectively. Consequently, we could break 2-round RAIN with the 128/192/256-bit key in only 2{116} / 2{171} / 2{224} bit operations. For the full-round AIM with the 128/192/256-bit key, we could break them in 2{136.2} / 2{200.7} / 2{265} bit operations, which are equivalent to about 2{115} / 2{178} / 2{241} calls of the underlying primitive. | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
コンピュータセキュリティシンポジウム2023論文集 p. 479-483, 発行日 2023-10-23 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| 出版者 | 情報処理学会 | |||||||||
