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Can Completion Entail
Circumscription (Sometimes)?

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1. Introduction

Circumscription, a form of non-monotonic reasoning, proposed by *J. McCarthy*^[3], of first-order predicate symbols are second-order formula. The formulas derivable from a theory *T* augmented by the circumscription of a predicate symbol *P* are just those true in all models of *T* minimal in *P*. In order to achieve this kind of minimal derivation, it is very important to find out some suitable first-order instances of circumscription. As there is actually such instances, we say the theory *T* is circumscriptively reducible^[1] wrt the predicate symbol *P*. Completion of a theory, proposed by *Keith L. Clark*^[4], is one way to represent closed world assumption^[6] by assuming given sufficient condition about a predicate is also necessary. Shown in [7], circumscription of a predicate symbol *P* in a theory *T* Horn in *P* implies the completion of *T* wrt *P*. Here we will show that the completion of *T* wrt *P* entails the circumscription of *P* in *T* in the model-theoretical viewpoint.

2. Circumscription

Let *T(P)* be a theory with occurrences of *P* in the first-order language *L*. The *circumscription* of *P* in *T(P)* is defined by the following expression (1).

$$\forall p. [T(p) \wedge [\forall x. p(x) \supset P(x)] \supset \forall x. P(x) \supset p(x)] \quad (1)$$

Here *P* is an *n*-ary predicate symbol and *p* an *n*-ary predicate variable. *T(p)* is the conjunction of formulas of *T* with each occurrence of *P* replaced by *p*. Reasoning about the theory *T* under the closed world assumption has much in common with inferring from the theory *T* together with this formula. This enlarged theory, *Circum(T; P)*, is called the circumscription of *P* in *T*.

3. Reducibility

Definition1

An *interpretation* *I* of a first-order language *L* consists of:

- (1) a non-empty Herbrand universe *D*;
- (2) $I[K]: D^n \rightarrow D$ if *K* is an *n*-ary function symbol;
 $I[K]: D^n \rightarrow \{\text{True}, \text{False}\}$
if *K* is an *n*-ary predicate symbol.
 $I[K^+] = \{a \in D^n \mid I[K](a) = \text{True}\}$ and $I[K^+] \subset D^n$;
 $I[K^-] = \{a \in D^n \mid I[K](a) = \text{False}\}$ and $I[K^-] \subset D^n$.

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We say an interpretation *I*^[2] is a *model* of a formula *G* if *G* is evaluated to True in *I* and *I* is a model of theory *T* if every formula in *T* is satisfied by *I*. $T \models \beta$ is used to stand for that β is *entailed* by *T*, i.e., β is true in every model of *T*.

A sub-interpretation *N* of *M* for *T* wrt a predicate symbol *P*, $N \leq_P M$, is defined as:

1. *N* and *M* have a same domain;
2. For each symbol *K* (constant or function or predicate symbol), $M[K] = N[K]$, when $K \neq P$;
3. $N[P^+] \subseteq M[P^+]$.

A model *M*₀ of *T* is said to be minimal wrt *P* iff for any model *M* of *T*, if $M \leq_P M_0$ then $M = M_0$. $T \models_P \beta$ is used to stand for that β is *minimally entailed* by *T*, i.e., β is true in every model of *T* minimal wrt *P*.

Definition2

Let *T* be a first-order theory with occurrences of a predicate symbol *P*. *Circum(T; P)* is said to be *reducible* iff there is a first-order theory, written as *T*_{Circum}(*T; P*), model-theoretically equivalent to *Circum(T; P)*. That is, for any wff β in the first-order language,

$$\text{Circum}(T; P) \models \beta \quad \text{iff} \quad T_{\text{Circum}}(T; P) \models \beta.$$

T is said to be *circumscriptively reducible* on *P* when *Circum(T; P)* is reducible.

4. Completion

Suppose that

$$L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_m \supset P(t_1, \dots, t_n) \quad (2)$$

is a clause about a predicate symbol *P*. Let $=$ be the equality relation, and x_1, \dots, x_n be variables not appearing in the clause. (2) is equivalent to the clause

$$x_1 = t_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_n = t_n \wedge L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_m \supset P(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

Finally, if y_1, \dots, y_r are the variables in (2), it is itself equivalent to

$$(\exists y_1, \dots, y_r) [x_1 = t_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_n = t_n \wedge L_1 \wedge \dots \wedge L_m] \supset P(x_1, \dots, x_n) \quad (3)$$

we call this the *general form* of the clause.

Suppose there are exactly *k* clauses, $k > 0$, about the predicate symbol *P*. Let

$$E_1 \supset P(x_1, \dots, x_n) \\ \dots \dots \dots E_k \supset P(x_1, \dots, x_n) \quad (4)$$

be *k* general forms of these clauses. Each of *E_i* will be an existentially quantified conjunction of literals as in (3). The *definition of P*, implicitly given by all of those *k* clauses, is

$$(\forall x_1, \dots, x_n) [E_1 \vee E_2 \vee \dots \vee E_k \equiv P(x_1, \dots, x_n)] \quad (5)$$

The *if-half* of this definition is just the *k* general form

clauses (4) grouped as a single implication. The *only-if-half* is the *completion axiom* for P.

5. Circumscription Implies Completion (Sometimes)

A first-order theory of clausal form T is said to be *Horn in P* iff every clause in T contains at most one positive literal on the predicate symbol P. Notice that the definition allows any number of positive literals in the clauses in T as long as their predicate symbols are distinct from P. Any such theory T may be partitioned into two disjoint sets:

T_P : those clauses in T containing exactly one positive literal in P, and

$T - T_P$: those clauses of T containing no positive (but possibly negative) literals on P.

The *completion* of T wrt P, $\text{Comp}(T; P)$, is a theory of T with T_P replaced by the definition of P.

Theorem1^[7]

Let T be a first order theory of clausal form, Horn in a predicate symbol P. Then

$\text{Circum}(T; P) \vdash \text{Comp}(T; P)$

i.e., the completion of T wrt P is derivable from the circumscription of P in T.

6. Completion Minimally Entails

Circumscription (Sometimes)

As shown in [3], every *wff* circumscriptively inferred from $\text{Circum}(T; P)$ is true in all models of T minimal wrt P. That is, $\text{Circum}(T; P)$ is minimally entailed by T wrt P.

Lemma1 $T \models_P \text{Circum}(T; P)$.

Lifschitz V. has presented that $\text{Circum}(T; P)$ can be satisfied only by models of T minimal wrt P^[5].

Lemma2 For any model M of T, if it satisfies $\text{Circum}(T; P)$, then it is minimal wrt P.

Lemma3 Let T be a clausal theory Horn in P. Then $T \models_P \text{Comp}(T; P)$.

[PROOF] It is sufficient to prove the *only-if-half* of (5) is satisfied by any model M_0 of T minimal in P.

Firstly suppose the *only-if-half* of (5) is not satisfied by M_0 . Then there is at least one $P(a_1, \dots, a_n)$ satisfied by M_0 but $(E_1 \vee \dots \vee E_k) \theta$ not, and $\theta = \{x_1/a_1, \dots, x_n/a_n\}$. Thus a sub-interpretation M_0' of M_0 can be constructed in such a way that it agrees with M_0 on every symbol except for P, and $M_0[P^+] = M_0'[P^+] - (a_1, \dots, a_n)$. Obviously $M_0' <_P M_0$, and M_0' is a model of T. This contradicts with the minimality of M_0 . Hence, the *only-if-half* of (5) is satisfied by any model M_0 of T minimal wrt P. ■

Together with above lemmas, we know that the models of $\text{Circum}(T; P)$ are all of those minimal wrt P and $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ is true in all of models of T minimal wrt P. Then $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ is true in all of models of $\text{Circum}(T; P)$. By the definition of \models , we have the following theorem.

Theorem2

Let T be a first-order theory of clausal form Horn in P. Then $\text{Circum}(T; P) \models \text{Comp}(T; P)$.

Observing (5), $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ is actually satisfied only by models of T minimal wrt P if T is Horn in P.

Lemma4 Let T be a clausal first-order theory Horn in P. Then any model M of $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ minimal in P is a model of T minimal in P.

[PROOF] Let M be a model of $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ minimal in P. Then M is a model of T. Now we shall prove that M is minimal in P. Suppose M_0 is a model of T with $M_0 \leq_P M$. Then for any $P(a_1, \dots, a_n)$ satisfied by M but not by M_0 , $(E_1 \vee \dots \vee E_k) \theta \supset P(a_1, \dots, a_n)$ has to be satisfied by M_0 , where $\theta = \{x_1/a_1, \dots, x_n/a_n\}$. Then we can construct a proper sub-interpretation M' of M by:

$M'[K] = M[K]$ if $K \neq P$ and

$M'[P] = M_0[P] - (a_1, \dots, a_n)$.

M' is obviously a model of $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ with $M' <_P M$. This contradicts the minimality of M. Therefore the model M of $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ minimal in P is also a minimal model of T in P. ■

Theorem3

Let T be a clausal first-order theory Horn in P. Then $\text{Comp}(T; P) \models_P \text{Circum}(T; P)$.

Summarize above two theorems, $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ is entailed by $\text{Circum}(T; P)$ and $\text{Circum}(T; P)$ is minimally entailed by $\text{Comp}(T; P)$. Because it is not always that a model of $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ is a model of T minimal in P, then $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ seems not always to be a suitable instance of $\text{Circum}(T; P)$ even if T is a clausal theory Horn in P.

Theorem4

Let T be a clausal first-order theory Horn in P. $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ is not a circumscriptively reduced theory of T wrt P, i.e., $T_{\text{Circum}}(T; P)$, if there is at least one model of $\text{Comp}(T; P)$ is not a model of T minimal in P.

7. Conclusions

According to theorem4, a class of first-order theories, being of clausal form and Horn in a predicate symbol P, has been found. The circumscription of P in the theory of this class is minimally entailed by the completion of T wrt P. And it cannot be expected that for any theory of this class, the circumscription of a predicate symbol P is generally identified with its completion wrt P.

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