

## A Dynamic Attribute-Based Group Signature Scheme and Its Application in an Anonymous Survey for the Collection of Attribute Statistics

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Recently, cryptographic schemes based on the user's attributes have been proposed. An Attribute-Based Group Signature (ABGS) scheme is a kind of group signature scheme, where a user with a set of attributes can prove anonymously whether she has these attributes or not. An access tree is applied to express the relationships among some attributes. However, previous schemes did not provide a way to change an access tree. In this paper, we propose a dynamic ABGS scheme that can change an access tree. Our ABGS is efficient in that re-issuing of the attribute certificate previously issued for each user is not necessary. The number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes in both signing and verifying. Finally, we discuss how our ABGS can be applied to an anonymous survey for collection of attribute statistics.

### 1. Introduction

User identities (such as name, e-mail address and so on) are often used to access several information sources, and moreover as their public keys in Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes<sup>(6),10)</sup>. An encryptor can restrict a decryptor to indicate the identity of the decryptor. Recently, cryptographic schemes based on the user's attributes have been proposed. A user has not only his identity but also some attributes such as gender, age, affiliation, and so on. An Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is an encryption scheme, where users with some attributes can decrypt any ciphertext associated with these attributes. The first proposed ABE<sup>(32)</sup> was inspired by IBE. In ABE schemes, an encryptor can indicate many decryptors by assigning common attributes of these decryptors. There are two

kinds of ABE: Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). KP-ABE<sup>(16),32)</sup> are schemes where each private key is associated with an access structure. In CP-ABE<sup>(9),12),15),26),34)</sup> schemes, each ciphertext is associated with an access structure. As an important property of ABE, collusion resistance of secret keys is required. Users cannot generate a new secret key by combining their secret keys even if users collude with each other. This means that an IBE scheme cannot be regarded as an ABE scheme to treat the user's identity associated with an attribute, since collusion resistance of secret keys is not satisfied. There are some extended ABE schemes like the ABE schemes with multi-authority<sup>(11),19)</sup>, a distributed ABE scheme<sup>(22)</sup>, and an attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme<sup>(20)</sup>. In addition, there are attribute-based cryptographic schemes with anonymity such as a CP-ABE scheme with recipient anonymity<sup>(26)</sup>, a secret handshake scheme with fuzzy matching<sup>(1)</sup>.

Attribute-Based Group Signature (ABGS) schemes<sup>(17),18)</sup> have been proposed. ABGS schemes<sup>(17),18)</sup> are a kind of Group Signature (GS) schemes<sup>(5),14),24)</sup>, where a user with a set of attributes can prove anonymously whether she has these attributes or not. The first ABGS<sup>(18)</sup> has been constructed using Goyal's ABE<sup>(16)</sup> and Boneh's GS<sup>(5)</sup>. In addition to this, an ABGS scheme with revocation has been proposed<sup>(17)</sup>. To the best of our knowledge, these two schemes are the only proposals for an ABGS. As an important property of ABGS, collusion resistance of attribute certificates is required. Users cannot generate a new attribute certificate by combining their attribute certificates even if users collude with each other. A GS scheme cannot be regarded as an ABGS scheme to treat a signatory group associated with an attribute. For example, a user with the membership certificate of a group  $A$  and a user with the membership certificate of a group  $B$  can make a group signature of the groups  $A$  and  $B$  when users collude with each other. Some GSs treat plural groups such as multi-group signature<sup>(3)</sup>, hierarchical group signature<sup>(33)</sup> and sub-group signature<sup>(27)</sup>. A multi-group signature<sup>(3)</sup> considers that a member belonging to an intersection of two groups can make a group signature corresponding to both groups. A hierarchical group signature<sup>(33)</sup> considers hierarchical tree structure and plural group managers. Plural group managers can execute the Join and Revoke algorithms for inferior level signers and the Open algorithm for group signatures made by inferior level signers. In a

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sub-group signature<sup>27)</sup>, signers belonging to one of the subgroups can make group signatures. The identity of the subgroup used in the signature cannot be determined from the signature. ABGS is a kind of Sub-Group Signature, although ABGS considers plural numbers of *explicit* subgroups, where each subgroup is associated with an attribute.

Usually, users have many kinds of attributes, where some relationships exist among these attributes. An access tree<sup>16)–18)</sup> is applied to express these relationships. A trivial ABGS scheme can be constructed to simply combine an ABE scheme and a GS scheme. This construction has been used in previous ABGS schemes<sup>17),18)</sup>. However, these schemes did not provide a way to change the relationships among attributes. If an access tree has to be changed (when some threshold values are changed, or some attributes are deleted or added), then a user has only to be re-issued with all attribute certificates to execute the Join algorithm again. In addition to this, the number of calculations in a pairing depends on the number of attributes associated with a signature in these schemes. Our main aim is to solve these problems, namely, the changing of an access tree and the reduction of the computational cost due to bilinear pairing applications in verification.

As an application of ABGS, anonymous survey is known, where an application provider can obtain a collection of user attribute statistical information with relationships among certain attributes without exposing each user's information. An anonymous survey with trusted third parties (TTPs) has been proposed<sup>30)</sup>. A user with some attributes sends the distributor a ciphertext encrypted with the public key of the TTP who is in charge of the user's attribute type. However, the distributor cannot verify whether users properly construct the ciphertext or not. An anonymous survey using the open algorithm of Ateniese, et al. GS<sup>2)</sup> has been proposed<sup>25)</sup>. A distributor can verify whether users properly make the ciphertext or not, to verify the validity of group signatures. Because one attribute certificate is issued for an attribute type, it is difficult for the relationships among some attributes to be handled in the statistical information. Anonymous survey based on ABGS can solve these problems. However, even if anonymous survey is realized by using previous ABGS schemes, attributes and relationships among these attributes can be determined only once, although, for each survey, a differ-

ent relationship has to be treated. It is desirable that an attribute-based scheme treats the changing of the relationships among attributes without executing any algorithm between users and a group manager.

**Our Contribution :** In this paper, we propose a dynamic ABGS scheme that can change an access tree when some threshold values are changed, or some attributes are deleted. To achieve the dynamic property, a Bottom-Up Approach construction is introduced, where all secret values are chosen for each attribute associated with each leaf. These secret values of leaves shall not be changed when the access tree is changed. Although there are several protocols based on a tree-based access structure, such as previous ABGS schemes<sup>17),18)</sup> and a KP-ABE scheme<sup>16)</sup>, to the best of our knowledge, our Bottom-Up Approach construction has not been introduced yet. These schemes do not allow the changing of an access tree, namely, they do not guarantee security after the access tree is changed. On the other hand, our scheme guarantees security after the access tree is changed to admit that an adversary can issue the Re-BuildTree oracle to execute the update of an access tree in the security games. Our ABGS is efficient since re-issuing of the attribute certificate that was previously issued for each user is not necessary. When a new attribute *att* is added to an access tree, an attribute certificate corresponding to that specific attribute *att* needs to be issued for the eligible user(s) only. Added to this, the number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes in both signing and verifying. Our scheme is suitable for use in an anonymous survey because the changing of relationships is indispensable in the anonymous survey for the collection of attribute statistics.

**Organization :** The paper is organized as follows. Definitions are given in Section 2. Our scheme is described in Section 3. Security analysis is performed in Section 4. Efficiency comparisons are presented in Section 5. The application of our ABGS in an anonymous survey for the Collection of Attribute Statistics is demonstrated in Section 6.

## 2. Definitions

### 2.1 Bilinear Groups and Complexity Assumptions

**Definition 1 (Bilinear Groups)** We use *bilinear groups* and a *bilinear map* defined as follows:

- (1)  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$  and  $\mathbb{G}_3$  are cyclic groups of prime order  $p$ .
- (2)  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  are generators of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , respectively.
- (3)  $\psi$  is an efficiently computable isomorphism  $\mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$  with  $\psi(g_2) = g_1$ .
- (4)  $e$  is an efficiently computable bilinear map  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$  with the following properties.
  - *Bilinearity* : for all  $u, u' \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $v, v' \in \mathbb{G}_2$ ,  $e(uu', v) = e(u, v)e(u', v)$  and  $e(u, vv') = e(u, v)e(u, v')$ .
  - *Non-degeneracy* :  $e(g_1, g_2) \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}_3}$  ( $1_{\mathbb{G}_3}$  is the  $\mathbb{G}_3$ 's unit).

Our scheme is based on the *discrete logarithm (DL)*, *q-strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH)*<sup>4)</sup> and *eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH)*<sup>5)</sup> assumptions. For the security parameter  $k$ , let  $\epsilon = \epsilon(k)$  be a negligible function, namely for every polynomial  $poly(\cdot)$  and for sufficiently large  $k$ ,  $\epsilon(k) < 1/poly(k)$ .

**Definition 2 (DL assumption)** The DL problem in  $\mathbb{G}_2$  is defined as follows: given a  $(g = (g')^\xi, g') \in \mathbb{G}_2^2$  as input, where  $\xi \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , which outputs a value  $\xi$ . An algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  has an advantage  $\epsilon$  in solving the DL problem in  $\mathbb{G}_2$  if  $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g, g') = \xi] \geq \epsilon$ . We say that the DL assumption holds in  $\mathbb{G}_2$  if no PPT algorithm has an advantage of at least  $\epsilon$  in solving the DL problem in  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .

**Definition 3 (q-SDH assumption)** The *q-SDH* problem in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  is defined as follows: given a  $(q + 2)$  tuple  $(g, g', (g')^\xi, \dots, (g')^{\xi^q})$  as input, where  $g' \in \mathbb{G}_2$ ,  $g = \psi(g') \in \mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $\xi \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , which outputs a tuple  $(x, g^{1/(\xi+x)})$ , where  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . An algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  has an advantage  $\epsilon$  in solving the *q-SDH* problem in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  if  $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g, g', (g')^\xi, \dots, (g')^{\xi^q}) = (x, g^{1/(\xi+x)})] \geq \epsilon$ . We say that the *q-SDH* assumption holds in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  if no PPT algorithm has an advantage of at least  $\epsilon$  in solving the *q-SDH* problem in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$ .

**Definition 4 (DDH assumption)** The DDH problem in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is as follows: given a tuple  $(g, g', g^u, (g')^v)$  as input, where  $g, g' \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , which outputs 1 if  $u = v$  or 0 otherwise. An algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  has an advantage  $\epsilon$  in solving the DDH problem in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  if  $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g, g', g^u, (g')^u) = 0] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(g, g', g^u, (g')^v) =$

$0]| \geq \epsilon$ . We say that the DDH assumption holds in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  if no PPT algorithm has an advantage of at least  $\epsilon$  in solving the DDH problem in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ .

**Definition 5 (XDH assumption)** Bilinear groups  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_3$  and a bilinear map  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$  and an efficiently computable isomorphism  $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$  with  $\psi(g_2) = g_1$  are given. We say that the XDH assumption holds if the DDH problem is hard in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ .

In this paper, we use the notation according to which, if  $S$  is a set, then  $x \in_R S$  denotes the operation of picking an element  $x$  of  $S$  uniformly at random.

### 2.2 Access Tree

Let  $Att = \{att_1, \dots, att_m\}$  be a set of attributes. For  $\Gamma \subseteq 2^{Att} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ ,  $\Gamma$  satisfies the *monotone property*: if  $\forall B, C \subseteq Att$ ,  $B \in \Gamma$  and  $B \subseteq C$ , then  $C \in \Gamma$  holds. Let access structures for  $Att$  be a set of  $\Gamma$  which satisfies the monotone property. An access tree<sup>16)-18)</sup>  $T$  is used for expressing an access structure by using a tree structure. An *access tree* is a tree, where threshold gates are defined on each interior node of the tree, and the leaves are associated with attributes. These attributes are subsets of  $Att$ . Let  $\ell_x$  be the number of children of node  $x$ , and  $k_x$  ( $0 < k_x \leq \ell_x$ ) be the threshold value on the threshold gate of node  $x$ . We call the threshold gate “OR gate” when  $k_x = 1$ , and “AND gate” when  $k_x = \ell_x$ . The notation  $Leaves \models T$  expresses the fact that a set of attributes  $Leaves$  satisfies the access tree  $T$ .

### 2.3 Model and Security Definitions

In this subsection, we define the model of an ABGS. An *ABGS* is a kind of GS, where a user  $U_i$  with a set of attributes  $\Gamma_i \subseteq Att = \{att_1, \dots, att_m\}$  can prove anonymously whether she has these attributes or not.  $U_i$  has a membership certificate  $A_i$  and a set of attribute certificates  $\{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i}$ .  $U_i$  makes a group signature associated with  $\zeta \subseteq \Gamma_i$ . Usually, for a set of attributes  $Att$ , we construct an access tree to consider all relationships among these attributes. However, the access tree is changed when some threshold values are changed, or some attributes are deleted. Therefore, we define the model of the ABGS accepting a change of an access tree.

Let  $GM$  be the *group manager*,  $k$  the *security parameter*,  $params$  the *system parameter*,  $Att = \{att_1, \dots, att_m\}$  the *a set of attributes*,  $T_r$  the *r-th access tree with a set of attributes*  $\{att\}$ , where  $att \in Att$  is assigned on each leaf,

$\mathcal{T}_r$  the public values associated with  $T_r$ ,  $gpk$  the *group public key*,  $ik$  the *group secret key* which is used for issuing a membership certificate and making  $\mathcal{T}_r$ ,  $ok$  the *opening key* which is used for the opening procedure to reveal the signers' identification from the group signature,  $(upk_i, usk_i)$  the *verification/signing key* of a signature scheme  $DSig$ ,  $sk_i$  the *member secret key* for  $U_i$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ),  $\Gamma_i \subseteq Att$  attributes of  $U_i$ , and  $reg$  be the *registration table* for open algorithm. Note that  $sk_i$  includes both  $A_i$  and  $\{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i}$ . In the Join algorithm, we use the notation  $Join(\langle \text{input of } GM \rangle, \langle \text{input of user} \rangle)$ .

**Definition 6** ABGS

- **Setup**( $1^k$ ): This algorithm takes the security parameter  $k$  as an input, and returns the system parameter  $params$ .
- **KeyGen**( $params$ ): This algorithm takes as input  $params$ , and returns the group public key  $gpk$ , the group secret key  $ik$ , the opening key  $ok$  and the registration table  $reg = \emptyset$ .
- **BuildTree**( $params, ik, T_r$ ): This algorithm takes as input  $params, ik$  and the  $r$ -th access tree  $T_r$  whose leaves are associated with a subset of  $Att$ , and returns  $\mathcal{T}_r$ .
- **Join**( $\langle params, gpk, ik, upk_i, \Gamma_i \rangle, \langle params, gpk, upk_i, usk_i \rangle$ ): This algorithm takes as input  $params, gpk, ik, upk_i$  and  $U_i$ 's attributes  $\Gamma_i$  from  $GM$ , and  $params, gpk, upk_i$  and  $usk_i$  from  $U_i$ , and returns the member secret key  $sk_i$  and  $reg$ .
- **Sign**( $param, gpk, sk_i, M, \zeta_i, \mathcal{T}_r$ ): Let  $\zeta_i \subseteq \Gamma_i$  be a set of attributes such that  $\zeta_i \models T_r$ . This algorithm takes as input  $params, gpk, sk_i$ , a message  $M$ ,  $\zeta_i$  and  $\mathcal{T}_r$ , and returns a group signature  $\sigma$  associated with  $\zeta_i$ .
- **Verify**( $param, gpk, M, \sigma, \zeta, \mathcal{T}_r$ ): This algorithm takes as input  $params, gpk, M, \sigma, \zeta$  and  $\mathcal{T}_r$ , and returns 1 if and only if  $\sigma$  is a valid signature.
- **Open**( $param, gpk, ok, \sigma, \zeta, \mathcal{T}_r, M, reg$ ): This algorithm takes as input  $params, gpk, ok, \sigma, \zeta, \mathcal{T}_r, M$  and  $reg$ , and returns the signer's identity  $i$ . If the signer is not included in  $reg$ , then this algorithm returns 0.

If the access tree  $T_r$  is changed to  $T_{r+1}$ , then  $GM$  runs **BuildTree**( $params, ik, T_{r+1}$ ), and opens  $\mathcal{T}_{r+1}$ , which is the public information associated with  $T_{r+1}$ . When a new attribute  $att_{m+1}$  is added to an access tree, an attribute certificate corresponding to that specific attribute  $att_{m+1}$  needs to be issued for the eligible

user(s) only.

**Definition 7** *Anonymity*: *Anonymity* requires that for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the following game is negligible.

- **Setup**: Let  $T_0$  be the initial access tree. The challenger runs **KeyGen**( $params$ ), and obtains  $gpk, ik$  and  $ok$ . The challenger runs **BuildTree**( $params, ik, T_0$ ), and obtains  $\mathcal{T}_0$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $params, gpk, \mathcal{T}_0$  and  $ik$ .
- **Phase1**:  $\mathcal{A}$  can send these queries as follows:
  - **Join**:  $\mathcal{A}$  requests the join procedure for honest member  $U_i$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  plays the role of corrupted  $GM$  on these queries.
  - **Signing**:  $\mathcal{A}$  requests a group signature  $\sigma$  for all messages  $M$ , and all members  $U_i$  with a set of attributes  $\zeta_i \subseteq \Gamma_i$ .
  - **Corruption**:  $\mathcal{A}$  requests the secret key  $sk_i$  for all members  $U_i$ .
  - **Open**:  $\mathcal{A}$  requests the signer's identity with a message  $M$  and a valid signature  $\sigma$ .
  - **Re-BuildTree**:  $\mathcal{A}$  sends an access tree  $T_r$ . The challenger returns public values  $\mathcal{T}_r$ .
- **Challenge**:  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $M^*$ , non-corrupted users  $U_{i_0}, U_{i_1}$  and  $\zeta$ . Note that  $\zeta \subseteq \Gamma_{i_0}, \zeta \subseteq \Gamma_{i_1}$  and  $\zeta \models T^*$ , where  $T^*$  is the access tree on the challenge phase. The challenger uniformly selects  $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ , and responds with a group signature on  $M^*$  by group member  $U_{i_b}$ .
- **Phase2**:  $\mathcal{A}$  can make the Signing, Corruption, Open, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. Note that Corruption queries include both  $U_{i_0}$  and  $U_{i_1}$ .
- **Output**:  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit  $b'$ , and wins if  $b' = b$ .

The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as  $Adv^{anon}(\mathcal{A}) = |\Pr(b = b') - \frac{1}{2}|$ .

In Join queries,  $\mathcal{A}$  can play the role of corrupted  $GM$  (the same as in **SndToU** oracle<sup>7)</sup>). In addition, we consider the Anonymity for *Key-Exposure*, namely, corruption queries for  $U_{i_0}$  and  $U_{i_1}$  can be admitted in Phase 2. Even after a secret key is exposed, signatures produced by the member before key-exposure remain anonymous. A similar definition of our key-exposure has been given<sup>8)</sup> for the ring signature scheme. Our definition is the *CCA-anonymity model*<sup>5),14)</sup>, namely, open queries in the Anonymity game can be admitted.

**Definition 8** *Traceability* requires that for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , the probability that

$\mathcal{A}$  wins the following game is negligible.

- **Setup:** Let  $T_0$  be the initial access tree. The challenger runs  $\text{KeyGen}(params)$ , and obtains  $gpk$ ,  $ik$  and  $ok$ . The challenger runs  $\text{BuildTree}(params, ik, T_0)$ , and obtains  $\mathcal{T}_0$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $params$ ,  $gpk$ ,  $\mathcal{T}_0$  and  $ok$ .
- **Queries:**  $\mathcal{A}$  can issue the Signing, Corruption, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. All queries are the same as in the Anonymity game, except Join.
  - **Join :**  $\mathcal{A}$  requests the Join procedure for corrupted member  $U_i$ .
- **Output:**  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a message  $M^*$ ,  $\sigma^*$  and  $\zeta^*$ .  $T^*$  is the access tree in this phase, and  $\mathcal{T}^*$  is the public information associated with  $T^*$ .

$\mathcal{A}$  wins if (1)  $\text{Verify}(params, gpk, M^*, \sigma^*, \zeta^*, T^*) = 1$ , (2)  $\text{Open}(params, gpk, ok, \sigma^*, \zeta^*, T^*, M^*, reg) = 0$ , and (3)  $\mathcal{A}$  has not obtained  $\sigma^*$  in Signing queries on  $M^*$ ,  $\zeta^*$  and  $T^*$ . The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins.

In Join queries,  $\mathcal{A}$  can play the role of corrupted users (the same as in  $\text{SndTol}$  oracle<sup>7</sup>).

**Definition 9** *Collusion resistance* requires that for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the following game is negligible.

- **Setup:** Let  $T_0$  be the initial access tree. The challenger runs  $\text{KeyGen}(params)$ , and obtains  $gpk$ ,  $ik$  and  $ok$ . The challenger runs  $\text{BuildTree}(params, ik, T_0)$ , and obtains  $\mathcal{T}_0$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $params$ ,  $gpk$  and  $\mathcal{T}_0$ .
- **Queries:**  $\mathcal{A}$  can issue the Signing, Corruption, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. All queries are the same as in the Anonymity game, except Join.
  - **Join :**  $\mathcal{A}$  requests the Join procedure for corrupted member  $U_i$ .
- **Output:** Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $M^*$ ,  $\sigma^*$  and  $\zeta^*$ .  $T^*$  is the access tree in this phase, and  $\mathcal{T}^*$  is the public information associated with  $T^*$ .

$\mathcal{A}$  wins if (1)  $\text{Verify}(params, gpk, M^*, \sigma^*, \zeta^*, T^*) = 1$ , and (2)  $\mathcal{A}$  has not obtained attribute certificates associated with  $\zeta^*$  corresponding to a single user.

This property indicates that, for example, there are two users  $U_{i_0}$  and  $U_{i_1}$  with  $\{T_{i_0, j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_{i_0}}$  and  $\{T_{i_1, j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_{i_1}}$ , respectively. We assume that  $\Gamma_{i_0} \subset \zeta^* \wedge \Gamma_{i_0} \neq \zeta^*$ ,  $\Gamma_{i_1} \subset \zeta^* \wedge \Gamma_{i_1} \neq \zeta^*$ , and that  $\zeta^* \subseteq \Gamma_{i_0} \cup \Gamma_{i_1}$  hold. Then  $U_{i_0}$  and  $U_{i_1}$  cannot make a valid group signature with  $\zeta^*$  even if  $U_{i_0}$  and  $U_{i_1}$  collude with each other.

**Definition 10** *Non-Frameability* requires that for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the following game is negligible.

- **Setup:** Let  $T_0$  be the initial access tree. The challenger runs  $\text{KeyGen}(params)$ , and obtains  $gpk$ ,  $ik$  and  $ok$ . The challenger runs  $\text{BuildTree}(params, ik, T_0)$ , and obtains  $\mathcal{T}_0$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $params$ ,  $gpk$ ,  $\mathcal{T}_0$ ,  $ik$  and  $ok$ .
- **Queries:**  $\mathcal{A}$  can issue the Signing, Corruption, Join and Re-BuildTree queries. All queries are the same as in the Anonymity game.
- **Output:** Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a message  $M^*$ , an honest member  $U_{i^*}$ ,  $\sigma^*$  and  $\zeta^*$ .  $T^*$  is the access tree in this phase, and  $\mathcal{T}^*$  is the public information associated with  $T^*$ .

$\mathcal{A}$  wins if (1)  $\text{Verify}(params, gpk, M^*, \sigma^*, \zeta^*, T^*) = 1$ , (2)  $\sigma^*$  opens to an honest member  $U_{i^*}$ , (3)  $\mathcal{A}$  has not obtained  $\sigma^*$  in Signing queries on  $M^*$ ,  $U_{i^*}$  and  $\zeta^*$ , and (4)  $\mathcal{A}$  has not obtained  $sk_{i^*}$  in Corruption queries on  $U_{i^*}$ . The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins.

### 3. Proposed Schemes

In this section, an ABGS together with an assignment of secret values to access trees is presented.

#### 3.1 Assignment of Secret Values to Access Trees

In this subsection, we propose the assignment of secret values to access trees. The previous schemes<sup>17),18)</sup> use a “*Top-Down Approach*” construction for access trees (when threshold gates are defined on each interior node of the tree and the leaves are associated with attributes) as follows:

- A secret value of the root node is chosen.
- A polynomial  $q_{root}(x)$  of degree “threshold value  $-1$ ” is defined such that  $q_{root}(0)$  equals the secret value of the root node.
- A secret value of a child node is defined such as  $q_{root}(index(child))$ .
- Secret values of all nodes can be defined to execute this procedure recursively.

If the access tree is changed, then the above Top-Down Approach construction has to be executed again. This means that the secret values that are associated with attributes have to be re-issued to corresponding users, because these values have to be changed. In our proposal, a “*Bottom-Up Approach*” construction is introduced. The order of our construction is different from that of the Top-Down Approach construction, namely, first all secret values are chosen for each attribute

associated with each leaf. These secret values of leaves will not be changed when the access tree is changed. Therefore, our ABGS is efficient in that re-issuing of the attribute certificate previously issued for each user is not necessary.

**Idea:** For a node  $x$  associated with the threshold value  $k_x$ ,  $\ell_x - k_x$  dummy nodes will be opened, where  $\ell_x$  is the number of children of  $x$ . Next, the threshold value is changed from  $k_x$  to  $\ell_x$ . Then, all threshold gates become AND gates. Children with  $k_x$  or more can compute the secret value of their parent node by using the number of  $\ell_x - k_x$  public dummy nodes. We define functions `AddDummyNode` which adds dummy nodes to the access tree, `AssignedValue` which assigns secret values for nodes on the access tree, and `MakeSimplifiedTree` which makes a *simplified tree* associated with a set of leaves. Let `index` be the function which returns the index of the node, and  $p$  be a prime number. We assume that  $T$  includes  $Att$ . `<AddDummyNode( $T$ )>`: This algorithm takes as input  $T$ , and returns the *extended access tree*  $T^{ext}$  with dummy nodes on  $T$ .

- (1) For an interior node  $x$  of  $T$ , the number of dummy nodes  $\ell_x - k_x$  is added to  $x$ 's children.
- (2) The threshold value defined in  $x$  is changed from  $k_x$  to  $\ell_x$ .
- (3) All nodes are assigned unique index numbers.
- (4) The resulting tree, called  $T^{ext}$ , is output.

Let  $D_T$  be a set of dummy nodes determined by `AddDummyNode`. We assume that  $T^{ext}$  includes  $D_T$ . Let  $s_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  be a secret value for an attribute  $att_j \in Att$ . Let  $S = \{s_j\}_{att_j \in Att}$ .

`<AssignedValue( $p, S, T^{ext}$ )>`: This algorithm takes as input  $p$ ,  $S$  and  $T^{ext}$  and returns a secret value  $s_x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  for each node  $x$  of  $T^{ext}$ . Let  $\{child\}_x$  be the set of node  $x$ 's children except the dummy nodes, and  $\{d\}_x$  be the set of node  $x$ 's dummy nodes.

- (1) For an interior node  $x$  of  $T^{ext}$ , a polynomial  $q_x$  of degree  $\ell_x - 1$  is assigned as follows:
  - (a) For  $att_j \in \{child\}_x$ , let  $q_x$  be a polynomial of degree at most  $\ell_x - 1$  which passes through  $(index(att_j), s_j)$ , where  $s_j \in S$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, \ell_x$ ).
  - (b) For a dummy node  $d_j \in \{d\}_x$ , the secret value  $s_{d_j} := q_x(index(d_j))$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, \ell_x - k_x$ ) is assigned.

(c) For  $x$ ,  $s_x := q_x(0)$  is assigned.

- (2) Repeat the above procedure up to the root node,  $s_T := q_{root}(0)$  is the secret value of  $T$ .

- (3) Output  $\{s_{d_j}\}_{d_j \in D_T}$  and  $s_T$ .

`<MakeSimplifiedTree( $Leaves, T^{ext}$ )>`: This algorithm takes as input the set of attributes  $Leaves \subseteq Att$  satisfying  $Leaves \models T$ , and returns the simplified access tree  $T^{Leaves}$  (which is the access tree associated with  $Leaves$ ) and a product of Lagrange coefficients  $\Delta_{leaf}$ .

- (1) The set of attributes  $\{att_j\}_{att_j \in Att \setminus Leaves}$  are deleted from  $T^{ext}$ .
- (2) An interior node  $x$  has children less than the threshold value (namely,  $\ell_x$ ), and is deleted from  $T^{ext}$  along with  $x$ 's descendants.
- (3) Let  $D^{Leaves}$  be the set of dummy nodes which have remained after (1) and (2), and  $T^{Leaves}$  be the access tree after (1) and (2).
- (4) For all nodes  $x$  of  $T^{Leaves}$  except root, we define  $L_x$  as follows:

- (a) For  $x$ , define the depth 2 subtree of  $T^{Leaves}$  with  $x$  as leaf node. Let  $c_x$  be the set of indices of leaves.
- (b) Compute  $L_x := \prod_{k \in c_x \setminus \{index(x)\}} \frac{-k}{index(x) - k}$ .

- (5) Let  $leaf \in \{att_j \in Leaves\} \cup \{d_j \in D^{Leaves}\}$  be a leaf node of  $T^{Leaves}$ . For  $leaf$ , we define  $\Delta_{leaf}$  as follows:

- (a) Let  $Path_{leaf} := \{leaf, parent_1, \dots, parent_{n_{leaf}} = root\}$  be the set of nodes that appears in the path from  $leaf$  to root node.
- (b) Compute  $\Delta_{leaf} := \prod_{node \in Path_{leaf} \setminus root} L_{node}$ .

- (6) Output  $T^{Leaves}$ ,  $\Delta_j$  ( $att_j \in Leaves$ ),  $\Delta_{d_j}$  ( $d_j \in D^{Leaves}$ ).

Clearly,  $\sum_{att_j \in Leaves} \Delta_j s_j + \sum_{d_j \in D^{Leaves}} \Delta_{d_j} s_{d_j} = s_T$  holds.

**Example 1** Let  $Att = \{A, B, C, D, E, F\}$  and  $T$  be a tree defined in **Fig. 1**.

Then,  $T^{ext} = \text{AddDummyNode}(T)$  is as follows (See **Fig. 2**). Let each index be assigned by using the depth-first search method. Then  $D_T = \{d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4\}$ .

Next, we run `AssignedValue( $p, S, T^{ext}$ )`. We introduce the assignment of secret values for the depth 2 subtree of  $T^{ext}$  such that  $A$  and  $B$  are leaves (See **Fig. 3**).

Let  $Leaves = \{A, E\}$ . Then  $Leaves \models T$  holds. The result of `MakeSimplifiedTree( $Leaves, T^{ext}$ )` is as follows (See **Fig. 4**):




Fig. 1 Access Tree  $T$ .




Fig. 4 Simplified Access Tree  $T^{Leaves}$ .




Fig. 2 Extended Access Tree  $T^{ext}$ .




Fig. 3 Assignment of Secret Values on  $T^{ext}$ .

$D^{Leaves} = \{d_1, d_2, d_4\}$ .  $s_{node_3} = L_4s_1 + L_6s_{d_1} = \frac{-6}{4-5}s_1 + \frac{-4}{6-4}s_{d_1}$ ,  $s_{node_2} = L_3s_{node_3} + L_{11}s_{d_2} = \frac{-11}{3-11}s_{node_3} + \frac{-3}{11-3}s_{d_2}$ , and  $s_{node_2} = L_3(L_4s_1 + L_6s_{d_1}) + L_{11}s_{d_2} = (L_4L_3)s_1 + (L_6L_3)s_{d_1} + L_{11}s_{d_2}$  holds. Therefore  $s_T = (L_4L_3L_2)s_1 + (L_6L_3L_2)s_{d_1} + (L_{11}L_2)s_{d_2} + (L_{13}L_{12})s_5 + (L_{15}L_{12})s_{d_4} = \Delta_4s_1 + \Delta_{13}s_5 + \Delta_6s_{d_1} + \Delta_{11}s_{d_2} + \Delta_{15}s_{d_4}$  holds.

### 3.2 Proposed Attribute-Based Group Signature Scheme

In this subsection, we propose the ABGS by using our assignment (Sec-

tion 3.1). Our ABGS uses the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme<sup>13)</sup> for both CCA-anonymity and key-exposure properties, and a concurrently secure Join algorithm<sup>14)</sup>. Let  $NIZK$  be a *Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge* proof,  $SPK$  a *Signature of Proof of Knowledge*, and  $Ext-Commit$  be an extractable commitment scheme which uses the Paillier's encryption scheme<sup>28)</sup>.  $Ext-Commit$  is necessary to extract the committed secret value of a corrupted user in the proof of Traceability. Let  $T_0$  be the initial access tree. Note that if an access tree is changed, then  $GM$  runs  $BuildTree(params, ik, T_{r+1})$ , and opens  $T_{r+1}$ , which is the public information associated with  $T_{r+1}$ .

- **Setup**( $1^k$ )

- (1)  $GM$  selects cyclic groups of  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ,  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , and  $\mathbb{G}_3$  with prime order  $p$ , an isomorphism  $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ , a bilinear map  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$ , and a hash function  $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ .
- (2)  $GM$  selects a generator  $g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$  and  $g_3, g_4 \in_R \mathbb{G}_1$ , and sets  $g_1 = \psi(g_2)$ .
- (3)  $GM$  defines  $Att = \{att_1, att_2, \dots, att_m\}$ .
- (4)  $GM$  outputs  $params = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_3, e, \psi, \mathcal{H}, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4, Att)$ .

- **KeyGen**( $params$ )

- (1)  $GM$  selects  $\gamma \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ , and computes  $\omega = g_2^\gamma$ .
- (2)  $GM$  selects  $x'_1, x'_2, y'_1, y'_2, z \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ , and computes  $C = g_3^{x'_1} g_4^{x'_2}$ ,  $D = g_3^{y'_1} g_4^{y'_2}$  and  $E = g_3^z$ .
- (3) For  $att_j \in Att$ ,  $GM$  selects  $s_j \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , sets  $S = \{s_j\}_{att_j \in Att}$ , and computes  $g_{att_j} = g_2^{s_j}$  ( $att_j \in Att$ ).

- (4) For  $att_j \in Att$ ,  $GM$  selects  $h_j \in_R \mathbb{G}_2$ , and sets  $\hat{h}_j = \psi(h_j)$ .
  - (5)  $GM$  outputs  $ok = (z)$ ,  $gpk = (\omega, C, D, E, \{h_j\}_{j=1}^m, \{gatt_j\}_{att_j \in Att})$  and  $ik = (\gamma, \{s_j\}_{att_j \in Att})$ .
- **BuildTree**( $params, ik, T_0$ )
    - (1)  $GM$  runs  $T_0^{ext} = \text{AddDummyNode}(T_0)$  and  $\text{AssignedValue}(p, S, T_0^{ext})$ , and gets  $\{s_{d_j}\}_{d_j \in D_{T_0}}$  and  $s_{T_0}$ .
    - (2)  $GM$  computes  $g_{d_j} = g_2^{s_{d_j}}$  ( $d_j \in D_{T_0}$ ) and  $v_0 = g_2^{s_{T_0}}$ .
    - (3)  $GM$  outputs  $T_0 = (\{g_{d_j}\}_{d_j \in D_{T_0}}, v_0, T_0^{ext})$ .
  - **Join**( $\langle params, gpk, ik, upk_i, \Gamma_i \rangle, \langle params, gpk, upk_i, usk_i \rangle$ )
 

$U_i$  gets  $sk_i = ((A_i, x_i, y_i), \{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i})$ , where  $(A_i, x_i, y_i)$  is a member certificate and  $\{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i}$  is the set of attribute certificates.

    - (1)  $U_i$  picks  $y_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  and computes  $c_i = \text{Ext-Commit}(y_i)$ ,  $F_i = E^{y_i}$  and  $\pi_1 = \text{NIZK}\{y_i : F_i = E^{y_i} \wedge c_i = \text{Ext-Commit}(y_i)\}$ .
    - (2)  $U_i$  sends  $F_i, c_i$  and  $\pi_1$  to  $GM$ .
    - (3)  $GM$  checks  $\pi_1$ . If  $\pi_1$  is not valid, then abort.
    - (4)  $GM$  selects  $x_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  and computes  $A_i = (g_1 F_i)^{1/(\gamma+x_i)}$ ,  $B_i = e(g_1 F_i, g_2)/e(A_i, w)$ ,  $D_i = e(A_i, g_2)$ ,  $T_{i,j} = A_i^{s_j}$  ( $att_j \in \Gamma_i$ ), and  $\pi_2 = \text{NIZK}\{x_i, s_j (att_j \in \Gamma_i) : B_i = D_i^{x_i} \wedge T_{i,j} = A_i^{s_j} (att_j \in \Gamma_i) \wedge gatt_j = g_2^{s_j} (att_j \in \Gamma_i)\}$ .
    - (5)  $GM$  sends  $A_i, B_i, D_i, \{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i}$  and  $\pi_2$  to  $U_i$ .
    - (6)  $U_i$  checks  $\pi_2$ . If  $\pi_2$  is not valid, then abort.
    - (7)  $U_i$  makes  $S_{i,A_i} = \text{DSig}_{usk_i}(A_i)$  and sends  $S_{i,A_i}$  to  $GM$ .
    - (8)  $GM$  verifies  $S_{i,A_i}$  with respect to  $upk_i$  and  $A_i$ . If  $S_{i,A_i}$  is valid, then  $GM$  sends  $x_i$  to  $U_i$  and adds  $(U_i, A_i)$  to  $reg$ .
    - (9)  $U_i$  checks the relation  $A_i^{(x_i+\gamma)} = g_1 E^{y_i}$  to verify whether  $e(A_i, g_2)^{x_i} e(A_i, w) e(E, g_2)^{-y_i} \stackrel{?}{=} e(g_1, g_2)$ .

$GM$  chooses  $s_{m+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , and computes  $gatt_{m+1} = g_2^{s_{m+1}}$  when an attribute  $att_{m+1}$  is added. Let  $U_i$  be issued  $T_{i,m+1}$ . Then  $GM$  computes  $T_{i,m+1} = A_i^{s_{m+1}}$  and  $\pi_3 = \text{NIZK}\{s_{m+1} : T_{i,m+1} = A_i^{s_{m+1}} \wedge gatt_{m+1} = g_2^{s_{m+1}}\}$ , and sends  $T_{i,m+1}$  and  $\pi_3$  to  $U_i$ , and opens  $gatt_{m+1}$ .
  - **Sign**( $param, gpk, sk_i, M, \zeta_i, T_r$ )
 

A signer  $U_i$  signs a message  $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$  as follows:

- (1)  $U_i$  chooses  $\zeta_i \subseteq \Gamma_i$  ( $\zeta_i \models T_r$ ) to associate  $\zeta_i$  with a group signature. Let  $|\zeta_i| = \phi$ .
  - (2)  $U_i$  runs  $\text{MakeSimplifiedTree}(\zeta_i, T_r^{ext})$ , and gets  $T_r^{\zeta_i}, \Delta_j$  ( $att_j \in \zeta_i$ ) and  $\Delta_{d_j}$  ( $d_j \in D_r^{\zeta_i}$ ).
  - (3)  $U_i$  computes  $g_d = \prod_{d_j \in D_r^{\zeta_i}} g_{d_j}^{\Delta_{d_j}}$ .
  - (4)  $U_i$  selects  $\alpha, \delta \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ , and computes  $C_1 = A_i E^\alpha$ ,  $C_2 = g_3^\alpha$ ,  $C_3 = g_4^\alpha$  and  $C_4 = (CD^\beta)^\alpha$ , where  $\beta = \mathcal{H}(C_1, C_2, C_3)$ .
  - (5)  $U_i$  computes  $CT_j = T_{i,j} \hat{h}_j^\delta$  ( $att_j \in \zeta_i$ ).
  - (6)  $U_i$  sets  $\tau = \alpha x_i + y_i$ , and computes  $V = \text{SPK}\{(\alpha, x_i, \tau, \delta) : \frac{e(C_1, \omega)}{e(g_1, g_2)} = \frac{e(E, g_2)^{\tau} \cdot e(E, \omega)^\alpha}{e(C_1, g_2)^{x_i}} \wedge C_2 = g_3^\alpha \wedge C_3 = g_4^\alpha \wedge C_4 = (CD^\beta)^\alpha \wedge \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} CT_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)}{e(C_1, v_r/g_d)} = \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} \hat{h}_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)^\delta}{e(E, v_r/g_d)^\alpha}\} (M)$ . Concretely,  $U_i$  computes  $V$  as follows:
    - (a)  $U_i$  selects  $r_\alpha, r_{x_i}, r_\tau, r_\delta \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ .
    - (b)  $U_i$  computes  $R_1 = \frac{e(E, g_2)^{r_\tau} e(E, \omega)^{r_\alpha}}{e(C_1, g_2)^{r_{x_i}}}$ ,  $R_2 = g_3^{r_\alpha}$ ,  $R_3 = g_4^{r_\alpha}$ ,  $R_4 = (CD^\beta)^{r_\alpha}$  and  $R_{Att} = \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} \hat{h}_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)^{r_\delta}}{e(E, v_r/g_d)^{r_\alpha}}$ .
    - (c)  $U_i$  computes  $c = \mathcal{H}(gpk, M, \{C_i\}_{i=1}^4, \{CT_i\}_{i=1}^\phi, \{R_i\}_{i=1}^4, R_{Att})$ .
    - (d)  $U_i$  computes  $s_\alpha = r_\alpha + c\alpha$ ,  $s_{x_i} = r_{x_i} + cx_i$ ,  $s_\tau = r_\tau + c\tau$  and  $s_\delta = r_\delta + c\delta$ .
  - (7)  $U_i$  outputs  $\sigma = (\{C_i\}_{i=1}^4, c, s_\alpha, s_{x_i}, s_\tau, s_\delta, \{CT_i\}_{i=1}^\phi)$
- A signer  $U_i$  proves the knowledge of  $(\alpha, x_i, \tau, \delta)$  which satisfies the 5 above relations described in  $\text{SPK}$ . The first relation captures whether a signer has a valid membership certificate issued by the Join algorithm or not. The last relation captures whether a signer has valid attribute certificates associated with the set of attributes  $\zeta_i \models T_r$  or not.
- **Verify**( $param, gpk, M, \sigma, \zeta, T_r$ )
 

A verifier verifies a group signature  $\sigma$  associated with the set of attributes  $\zeta$ .

    - (1) The verifier runs  $\text{MakeSimplifiedTree}(\zeta, T_r^{ext})$ , and gets  $T_r^\zeta, \Delta_j$  ( $att_j \in \zeta$ ) and  $\Delta_{d_j}$  ( $d_j \in D_r^\zeta$ ). Let  $|\zeta| = \phi$ .



- (2) The verifier computes  $g_d = \prod_{d_j \in D_r^\zeta} g_{d_j}^{\Delta_{d_j}}$  and  $\beta = \mathcal{H}(C_1, C_2, C_3)$ .
- (3) The verifier computes  $\tilde{R}_1 = \frac{e(E, g_2)^{s_\tau} \cdot e(E, \omega)^{s_\alpha}}{e(C_1, g_2)^{s_{x_i}}} \left( \frac{e(g_1, g_2)}{e(C_1, \omega)} \right)^c$ ,  $\tilde{R}_2 = g_3^{s_\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{C_2} \right)^c$ ,  $\tilde{R}_3 = g_4^{s_\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{C_3} \right)^c$ ,  $\tilde{R}_4 = (CD^\beta)^{s_\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{C_4} \right)^c$  and  $\tilde{R}_{Att} = \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} \hat{h}_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)^{s_\delta}}{e(E, v_r/g_d)^{s_\alpha}} \left( \frac{e(C_1, v_r/g_d)}{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} CT_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)} \right)^c$ .
- (4) The verifier checks  $c \stackrel{?}{=} \mathcal{H}(gpk, M, gpk, M, \{C_i\}_{i=1}^4, \{CT_i\}_{i=1}^\phi, \{\tilde{R}_i\}_{i=1}^4, \tilde{R}_{Att})$ .
- **Open**( $param, gpk, ok, \sigma, \zeta, T_r, M, reg$ )
    - (1)  $GM$  verifies the validity of  $\sigma$  by using  $\text{Verify}(param, gpk, M, \sigma, \zeta, T_r)$ . If  $\sigma$  is not a valid signature, then  $GM$  outputs  $\perp$ .
    - (2)  $GM$  computes  $A_i = C_1/C_2^z$ .
    - (3)  $GM$  searches  $A_i$  from  $reg$ , and outputs identity  $i$ . If there is no entry in  $reg$ , then  $GM$  outputs 0.

Our ABGS can be regarded as a GS without having the related part of  $s_\delta, CT_1, \dots, CT_\phi$ . Then  $\sigma = (C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4, c, s_\alpha, s_{x_i}, s_\tau)$  is a group signature, where  $c = \mathcal{H}(gpk, M, C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4)$ . Our GS provides CCA-anonymity, key-exposure and non-frameability. Boneh's GS<sup>5)</sup> (which applied by Khader to propose ABGS) does not provide above properties. This is the reason why we apply the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme to propose our ABGS.

### 3.3 Reduce the Authority of the group manager

In this subsection, we describe the authority of  $GM$ . In the Join algorithm,  $GM$  can obtain all attributes of all group members, since  $GM$  knows the attributes of the members when issuing attribute certificates. Therefore, the authority of  $GM$  is stronger compared with  $GM$  of usual GS schemes<sup>5),14),24)</sup>. There is a ways to distribute the authority of  $GM$ . Several separate  $GM$ s for each role are defined, namely, an issuer who issues membership certificates and an opener who opens a group signature are defined. Here, we give the detailed way to distribute the authority. An issuer who issues membership certificates, an opener who opens a group signature, and several *Attribute Managers* ( $AM$ s) are defined. An  $AM_k$  ( $k \in \mathbb{N}$ ) manages a set of attribute  $Att_k \subseteq Att$ , and issues an attribute

certificate associated with  $att \in Att_k$ . For  $k \neq k'$ ,  $Att_k \cap Att_{k'} = \emptyset$  is assumed. Although  $AM_k$  obtains attributes  $Att_k$  of all group members,  $AM_k$  does not obtain attributes  $Att_{k'}$  of all group members, where  $k' \neq k$ . As a classification of dividing  $AM$ s,  $AM_k$  is defined for a unity of attributes which belong to the same category. For example, we consider unities of attributes "gender" and "age", and a tree-structure is expressed as  $(male \vee female) \wedge (10s, \dots, 80s)$ . Then  $AM_1$  manages  $\{male, female\}$ , and  $AM_2$  manages  $\{10s, \dots, 80s\}$ . In KeyGen phase,  $AM_k$  chooses  $s_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , where  $att_j \in Att_k$ . In Join phase,  $AM_k$  issues attribute certificates  $T_{i,j} = A_i^{s_j}$  for a user  $U_i$ , where  $att_j \in Att_k \cap \Gamma_i$ . This procedure is as follows: Let  $U_i$  be issued  $T_{i,j}$ , where  $att_j \in Att_k$ . Then  $AM_k$  computes  $T_{i,j} = A_i^{s_j}$  and  $\pi_4 = \text{NIZK}\{s_j : T_{i,j} = A_i^{s_j} \wedge g_{att_j} = g_2^{s_j}\}$ .

## 4. Security

In this section, we show that our scheme satisfies anonymity, traceability, collusion resistance, and non-frameability. Let  $p, q_H$  and  $q_S$  be the order of bilinear groups, and the number of hash queries and signature queries, respectively.

**Theorem 1** The proposed scheme satisfies anonymity under the XDH assumption (namely DDH assumption over  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ) in the random oracle model, i.e.,  $\text{Adv}^{anon}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{q_S q_H}{p} + m \cdot \epsilon_{\text{ddh}}$  holds, where  $\epsilon_{\text{ddh}}$  is the DDH-advantage of some algorithms and  $m = |Att|$ .

**Theorem 2** We suppose an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  breaks the Traceability of the proposed scheme with the advantage  $\epsilon$ . Then, in the random oracle model, we can construct an algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  that breaks the  $q$ -SDH assumption with the advantage  $\frac{1}{6}(1 - \frac{1}{p})(1 - \frac{q_S q_H}{p})\epsilon$ .

**Theorem 3** We suppose an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  breaks the non-frameability of the proposed scheme with the advantage  $\epsilon$ . Then, we can construct an algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  that breaks the DL assumption with the advantage  $\frac{1}{12}(1 + \frac{1}{n})(1 - \frac{q_S q_H}{p})\epsilon$ .

**Theorem 4** The probability that a signature by forged attribute certificates passes the verification,  $\Pr(\text{Verify}(params, gpk, M, \sigma, \zeta, T) = 1 \wedge \zeta \neq T)$ , is at most  $1/p$ .

**Theorem 5** Even if some malicious participants  $U_{i_1}, \dots, U_{i_k}$  ( $k > 1$ ) with the set of attributes  $\zeta_{i_1}, \dots, \zeta_{i_k}$  collude, they cannot make a valid signature associated with an attribute tree  $T_r$ , where  $(\cup_{j=1}^k \zeta_{i_j}) \models T_r$  and  $\zeta_{i_j} \not\models T_r$  ( $j = 1, \dots, k$ ) with

non-negligible probability.

We give the proof of Theorem 1 as follows:

**Proof 1** We give a proof of anonymity of the proposed scheme under the XDH assumption (namely DDH assumption over  $\mathbb{G}_1$ ), using a sequence of games<sup>31</sup>). Let  $\mathcal{C}_j$  and  $S_j$  be the challenger on  $j$ -th Game and the event that an adversary wins on  $j$ -th Game, respectively, and  $\sigma^* = (C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*, C_4^*, \{CT_j^*\}_{att_j \in \zeta}, V^*)$  be the challenge group signature. Moreover, let  $q_H$  and  $q_S$  be the number of hash queries and signature queries, respectively, and  $\epsilon_{\text{ddh}}$  be the DDH-advantage of some algorithms. Without loss of generality,  $\zeta = \{att_1, att_2, \dots, att_\phi\}$ .

**Game 0.** This is the original anonymity game defined in Definition 7. Let  $params = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_3, e, \psi, \mathcal{H}, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4, Att)$ .  $\mathcal{C}_0$  chooses  $x'_1, x'_2, y'_1, y'_2, z_1, z_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . Moreover,  $\mathcal{C}_0$  computes  $C = g_3^{x'_1} g_4^{x'_2}$ ,  $D = g_3^{y'_1} g_4^{y'_2}$  and  $E = g_3^{z_1} g_4^{z_2}$ . Although R. Cramer and V. Shoup insist that “the simulator’s key generation algorithm is slightly different from the key generation algorithm of the actual cryptosystem”, in the original paper<sup>13</sup>), W. Mao shows that “the  $E$  component of the public key construction is perfectly valid”<sup>21</sup>). Other parameters are chosen the same as for the real scheme setting.  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $params$ ,  $gpk$  and  $ik$ .  $\mathcal{C}_0$  can answer all queries, because  $\mathcal{C}_0$  can choose all secret keys  $(ik, ok, sk_i)$ . Especially, for Re-BuildTree query  $T_r$ ,  $\mathcal{C}_0$  can run AssignedValue( $p, S, \text{AddDummyNode}(T_r)$ ), and returns  $\mathcal{T}_r = (\{g_{d_j}\}_{d_j \in D_{T_r}}, v_r = g_2^{s_{T_r}}, T_r^{ext})$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $M^*, U_{i_0}, U_{i_1}$ , and  $\zeta$  in the challenge phase.  $\mathcal{C}_0$  computes  $T_\zeta$  from both  $\zeta$  and  $T^*$ , where  $T^*$  is the access tree on this phase. Moreover  $\mathcal{C}_0$  selects  $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ , and computes  $A_{i_b}$  and  $\{T_{i_b, j}\}_{att_j \in \zeta} = \{A_{i_b}^{s_j}\}_{att_j \in \zeta}$  by using  $ik$ .  $\mathcal{C}_0$  selects  $u \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  and computes  $C_1^* = A_{i_b} E^u$ ,  $C_2^* = g_3^u$ ,  $C_3^* = g_4^u$  and  $C_4^* = (CD^{\beta^*})^u$ , where  $\beta^* = \mathcal{H}(C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*)$ .  $\mathcal{C}_0$  selects  $\delta \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ , and computes  $\{CT_j^*\}_{att_j \in \zeta} = \{T_{i_b, j} \hat{h}_j^\delta\}_{att_j \in \zeta}$  and  $V = SPK\{(u, x_{i_b}, \tau, \delta) : \frac{e(C_1^*, \omega)}{e(g_1, g_2)} = \frac{e(E, g_2)^\tau \cdot e(E, \omega)^u}{e(C_1^*, g_2)^{x_{i_b}}} \wedge C_2^* = g_3^u \wedge C_3^* = g_4^u \wedge C_4^* = (CD^{\beta^*})^u \wedge \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta} CT_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)}{e(C_1^*, v^*/g_d)} = \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta} \hat{h}_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)^\delta}{e(E, v^*/g_d)^u}\} (M^*)$ , where  $\tau = ux_{i_b} + y_{i_b}$  and  $v^* = g_2^{s_{T^*}}$ . Then the adversary’s advantage  $Adv^{anon}(\mathcal{A})$  is  $|\Pr[S_0] - \frac{1}{2}|$ .

**Game 1.** This is the same as Game 0 except SPK  $V^*$ , which includes the backpatch of the hash function  $\mathcal{H}$ , is simulated as follows:

(1)  $\mathcal{C}_1$  selects  $c^*, s_{x_{i_b}}^*, s_u^*, s_\tau^*, s_\delta^* \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ .

(2)  $\mathcal{C}_1$  computes  $R_1^* = \frac{e(E, g_2)^{s_\tau} \cdot e(E, \omega)^{s_u}}{e(C_1^*, g_2)^{s_{x_{i_b}}}} \left( \frac{e(g_1, g_2)}{e(C_1^*, \omega)} \right)^{c^*}$ ,  $R_2^* = g_3^{s_u} \left( \frac{1}{C_2^*} \right)^{c^*}$ ,

$R_3^* = g_4^{s_u} \left( \frac{1}{C_3^*} \right)^{c^*}$ ,  $R_4^* = (CD^{\beta^*})^{s_u} \left( \frac{1}{C_4^*} \right)^{c^*}$  and

$R_{Att}^* = \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta} \hat{h}_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)^{s_\delta}}{e(E, v^*/g_d)^{s_u}} \left( \frac{e(C_1^*, v^*/g_d)}{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta} CT_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)} \right)^{c^*}$ .

(3)  $\mathcal{C}_1$  defines  $c^* := \mathcal{H}(gpk, M, gpk, M, C_1^*, \dots, C_4^*, CT_1^*, \dots, CT_\phi^*, R_1^*, \dots, R_4^*, R_{Att}^*)$ .

(4)  $\mathcal{C}_1$  outputs  $V^* = (c^*, s_{x_{i_b}}^*, s_u^*, s_\delta^*, s_\tau^*)$ .

If simulation of the zero knowledge proof fails in signing queries, then  $\mathcal{C}_1$  aborts.

This probability  $\Pr[\text{abort}]$  is at most  $q_S q_H / p^{24}$ . Then  $|\Pr[S_0] - \Pr[S_1]| = \Pr[\text{abort}]$  holds.

**Game 2.** This is the same as Game 1 except  $C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*$  and  $C_4^*$  are constructed as follows:  $\mathcal{C}_2$  chooses  $u, v \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that  $u \neq v$ , sets  $U = g_3^u$  and  $V = g_4^v$ , and computes  $C_1^* = A_{i_b} U^{z_1} V^{z_2}$ ,  $C_2^* = U$ ,  $C_3^* = V$  and  $C_4^* = U^{x'_1 + y'_1 \beta^*} V^{x'_2 + y'_2 \beta^*}$ , where  $\beta^* = \mathcal{H}(C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*)$ . If  $u = v$ , then  $C_1^* = A_{i_b} g_3^{uz_1} \cdot g_4^{vz_2} = A_{i_b} E^u$ ,  $C_2^* = g_3^u$ ,  $C_3^* = g_4^v = g_4^u$ , and  $C_4^* = (g_3^{x'_1} g_4^{x'_2})^u (g_3^{y'_1} g_4^{y'_2})^{v\beta^*} = (CD^{\beta^*})^u$  hold. This is the same as Game 1. Therefore, obviously  $|\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_2]| = \epsilon_{\text{ddh}}$  holds.

**From Game 3 to Game  $\phi + 1$ .** Game  $j$  ( $j = 3, \dots, \phi + 1$ ) is the same as Game  $j - 1$  except  $CT_{j-2}^*$  and  $CT_{j-1}^*$  are constructed as follows:  $\mathcal{C}_j$  chooses  $u_j, v_j \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$  such that  $u_j \neq v_j$ .  $\mathcal{C}_j$  computes  $CT_{j-2}^* = T_{i_b, j-2} \hat{h}_{j-2}^{u_j}$  and  $CT_{j-1}^* = T_{i_b, j-1} \hat{h}_{j-1}^{v_j}$ . If  $u_j = v_j$ , then  $CT_{j-2}^* = T_{i_b, j-2} \hat{h}_{j-2}^{u_j}$  and  $CT_{j-1}^* = T_{i_b, j-1} \hat{h}_{j-1}^{u_j}$  hold. This is the same as Game  $j - 1$ . Therefore, obviously  $|\Pr[S_{j-1}] - \Pr[S_j]| = \epsilon_{\text{ddh}}$  holds.

Note that  $\Pr[S_{\phi+1}] = \frac{1}{2}$  because all parts of the challenge group signature in the case of  $U_{i_0}$  and all parts of the challenge group signature in the case of  $U_{i_1}$  have the same distributions. Combining all the probabilistic relations from Game 0 to Game  $\phi + 1$ ,  $Adv^{anon}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[S_0] - \frac{1}{2} \leq \frac{q_S q_H}{p} + \phi \cdot \epsilon_{\text{ddh}} \leq \frac{q_S q_H}{p} + m \cdot \epsilon_{\text{ddh}}$  holds, where  $m = |Att|$ .

Next, we give the proof of Theorem 2 as follows:

**Proof 2** We assume that the challenge attributes  $\zeta^*$  satisfy the challenge access tree  $T^*$ , namely,  $\zeta^* \models T^*$ . If  $\zeta^* \not\models T^*$ , then the probability of the signature

made by forged attribute certificates accepting the verification is negligible (See Theorem 4). The input of simulator  $\mathcal{B}$  is  $(g, g', (g')^\xi, \dots, (g')^{\xi^q}) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2^{q+1}$ . Let  $q-1$  be the number of all members,  $n$  be the number of honest members, and  $q_1 = q-1-n$  be the number of corrupted members. We assume that all initial members  $\{U_1, \dots, U_n\}$  are honest.  $\mathcal{B}$  simulates **KeyGen** as follows.

- (1)  $\mathcal{B}$  selects  $\mu \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ ,  $x_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, q-1$ ),  $y_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  ( $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ ),  $x'_1, x'_2, y'_1, y'_2, z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ ,  $g_4 \in \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $h_j \in \mathbb{G}_2$  ( $att_j \in Att$ ).
- (2)  $\mathcal{B}$  selects a target user  $U_{i^*} \in \{U_1, \dots, U_{q-1}\}$ , and sets  $\gamma := \xi - x_{i^*}$ .  $\mathcal{B}$  computes  $g_1, g_2, g_3$  and  $w$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} g_2 &:= (g')^\mu \prod_{i=1}^{q-1} (\xi + x_i - x_{i^*}) / (g')^{zy_{i^*}} \prod_{i=1, i \neq i^*}^{q-1} (\xi + x_i - x_{i^*}) \\ g_1 &:= \psi(g_2) = (g_3^{\mu\xi} / E^{y_{i^*}}) \\ g_3 &:= g^{\prod_{i=1, i \neq i^*}^{q-1} (\xi + x_i - x_{i^*})} \\ w &:= \left\{ (g')^{\mu\xi} \prod_{i=1}^{q-1} (\xi + x_i - x_{i^*}) / (g')^{zy_{i^*}} \prod_{i=1, i \neq i^*}^{q-1} (\xi + x_i - x_{i^*}) \right\} / g_2^{x_{i^*}} \\ &= g_2^{\xi - x_{i^*}} \\ &= g_2^\gamma \end{aligned}$$

$\mathcal{B}$  can compute these values by using the  $q$ -SDH input instance, because all parts of the exponent can be expressed as a polynomial of degree at most  $q$ .

- (3)  $\mathcal{B}$  computes  $C = g_3^{x'_1} g_4^{x'_2}$ ,  $D = g_3^{y'_1} g_4^{y'_2}$ ,  $E = g_3^z$  and other parameters.
- (4)  $\mathcal{B}$  makes  $params = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_3, e, \psi, \mathcal{H}, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4, Att)$ ,  $ok = (z)$ ,  $ik = (\gamma, \{s_j\}_{att_j \in Att})$ ,  $gpk = (\omega, C, D, E, \{h_j\}_{j=1}^m, \{g_{att_j}\}_{att_j \in Att})$  and  $\mathcal{T}_0 = (\{g_{d_j}\}_{d_j \in D_{\mathcal{T}_0}}, v_0, T_0^{ext})$ .  $params, \mathcal{T}_0, gpk$  and  $ok$  are given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

In the **Join** queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  can get a secret value  $y$  of a corrupted user to extract the commitment value.  $\mathcal{B}$  computes a group membership certificate as follows:

**In the case of  $i = i^*$ :**  $\mathcal{B}$  computes  $A_{i^*} = g_3^\mu = (g_3^{\mu\xi})^{\frac{1}{\xi}} = (g_1 E^{y_{i^*}})^{\frac{1}{\gamma + x_{i^*}}}$ .

**In the case of  $i \neq i^*$ :**  $\mathcal{B}$  computes  $A_i$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} A_i &= \left( g^z \prod_{j=1, j \neq i^*, i}^{q-1} (\xi + x_j - x_{i^*}) \right)^{y_i - y_{i^*}} \cdot g^\mu \prod_{j=1, j \neq i^*}^{q-1} (\xi + x_j - x_{i^*}) \\ &= g^{\frac{zy_i}{\xi + x_i - x_{i^*}} \prod_{j=1, j \neq i^*}^{q-1} (\xi + x_j - x_{i^*})} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\times \left\{ g^\mu \prod_{j=1}^{q-1} (\xi + x_j - x_{i^*}) / g^{zy_{i^*}} \prod_{j=1, j \neq i^*}^{q-1} (\xi + x_j - x_{i^*}) \right\}^{\frac{1}{\xi + x_i - x_{i^*}}} \\ &= (g_1 E^{y_i})^{\frac{1}{\gamma + x_i}} \end{aligned}$$

$\mathcal{B}$  can choose  $s_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  ( $att_j \in Att$ ). Therefore  $\mathcal{B}$  can compute  $\{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i} = \{A_i^{s_j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i}$ . For signing queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  makes a group signature by using  $(A_i, x_i, y_i, \{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i})$ , and returns this signature. For corruption queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  answers  $(A_i, x_i, y_i, \{T_{i,j}\}_{att_j \in \Gamma_i})$ . **Re-BuildTree** queries are the same as the proof of anonymity. Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a forged signature  $\sigma^* = (C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*, C_4^*, \{CT_j^*\}_{att_j \in \zeta^*}, c^*, s_\alpha^*, s_\delta^*, s_x^*, s_\tau^*)$ .

By using the Forking Lemma,  $\mathcal{B}$  can get the two valid signatures  $(C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*, C_4^*, \{CT_j^*\}_{att_j \in \zeta^*}, c^*, s_\alpha^*, s_\delta^*, s_x^*, s_\tau^*)$  and  $(C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*, C_4^*, \{CT_j^*\}_{att_j \in \zeta^*}, c', s'_\alpha, s'_\delta, s'_x, s'_\tau)$  with probability  $\epsilon' \geq \frac{1}{5} - \frac{8q_H}{\eta 2^k}$ ,  $\eta > \frac{240q_H}{2^k}$  (14). Let  $c'' = c^* - c'$ ,  $s''_\alpha = s_\alpha^* - s'_\alpha$ ,  $s''_x = s_x^* - s'_x$ , and  $s''_\tau = s_\tau^* - s'_\tau$ . Let  $\tilde{x} = s''_x / c''$ ,  $\tilde{\alpha} = s''_\alpha / c''$ ,  $\tilde{\tau} = s''_\tau / c''$ ,  $\tilde{A} = C_1^* / E^{\tilde{\alpha}}$ , and  $\tilde{y} = \tilde{\tau} - \tilde{\alpha} \tilde{x}$ .

Now  $(\tilde{A}, \tilde{x}, \tilde{y})$  is a valid member certificate because  $e(\tilde{A}, g_2)^{\tilde{x}} e(\tilde{A}, w) e(E, g_2)^{-\tilde{y}} = e(g_1, g_2)$  holds. We assume that  $\tilde{x} \neq x_{i^*}$ . This probability is  $1 - \frac{1}{p}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{A} &= (g_1 E^{\tilde{y}})^{\frac{1}{\tilde{x} + \gamma}} \\ &= (g_3^{\mu\xi} E^{\tilde{y} - y_{i^*}})^{\frac{1}{\tilde{x} + \gamma}} \\ &= g_3^{\frac{\mu\xi + z(\tilde{y} - y_{i^*})}{\tilde{x} + \gamma}} \\ &= \left( g^{(\mu\xi + z(\tilde{y} - y_{i^*}))} \prod_{i=1, i \neq i^*}^{q-1} (\xi + x_i - x_{i^*}) \right)^{\frac{1}{\tilde{x} + \xi - x_{i^*}}} \\ &= \left( g^{\sum_{i=0}^{q-1} a_i \xi^i} \right)^{\frac{1}{\tilde{x} + \xi - x_{i^*}}} \\ &= g^{\frac{b_0}{\tilde{x} + \xi - x_{i^*}} + \sum_{i=1}^{q-1} b_i \xi^i} \end{aligned}$$

The polynomial coefficients  $a_0, \dots, a_{q-1}, b_0, b_1, \dots, b_{q-1}$  can be computed by  $\mathcal{B}$ . Let  $x = \tilde{x} - x_{i^*}$ . Then  $(\tilde{A} / g^{\sum_{i=1}^{q-1} b_i \xi^i})^{\frac{1}{b_0}} = g^{\frac{1}{\tilde{x} + \xi}}$  holds. Therefore  $(x, g^{\frac{1}{\tilde{x} + \xi}})$  is the new SDH tuple. The advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  is  $(1 - \frac{1}{p})(1 - \frac{q_S q_H}{p})(\frac{1}{5} - \frac{8q_H}{\eta 2^k}) \epsilon \geq$

$\frac{1}{6}(1 - \frac{1}{p})(1 - \frac{qsqH}{p})\epsilon$ , since  $\eta > \frac{240qH}{2^k}$ .

Next, we give the proof of Theorem 3 as follows:

**Proof 3** The input of simulator  $\mathcal{B}$  is  $(g, g') \in \mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_2$ . We consider the two types of adversaries by the results of the Open algorithm. We explain the details of classification of the adversary in the proof. Let  $q$  be the number of all members,  $n$  be the number of honest members, and  $q_1 = q - n$  be the number of corrupt members. We assume that all initial members  $\{U_1, \dots, U_n\}$  are honest.  $\mathcal{B}$  simulates KeyGen as follows.

- (1)  $\mathcal{B}$  selects  $d \in_R \{0, 1\}$ ,  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  and  $s_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  ( $att_j \in Att$ ). If  $d = 1$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  selects a target user  $U_{i^*} \in \{U_1, \dots, U_n\}$ .  $d = 0$  means  $\mathcal{B}$  guesses that  $\mathcal{A}$  is a Type 1 Adversary. And  $d = 1$  means  $\mathcal{B}$  guesses that  $\mathcal{A}$  is a Type 2 Adversary.
- (2)  $\mathcal{B}$  computes the group public key and member certificates as follows:
  - (a)  $\mathcal{B}$  selects  $\gamma \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  and  $x_i, y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  ( $i \in [1, q]$ ). If  $d = 1$ , then  $i = i^*$  is excepted from the above  $[1, q]$ .
  - (b) If  $d = 0$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  sets  $g_1 = \psi(g)$ ,  $g_2 = g$  and  $g_3 = \psi(g')$ , and compute  $w = g_2^\gamma$  and  $E = g_3^z$ .
  - (c) If  $d = 1$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  sets  $g_2 \in_R \mathbb{G}_2$ ,  $g_1 = \psi(g_2)$ ,  $g_3 = g$ , and  $y_{i^*} = \xi$ .
  - (d)  $\mathcal{B}$  computes  $(A_i, x_i, y_i)$  ( $i \in [1, q]$ ) by using  $\gamma$ . If  $d = 1$ , then  $i = i^*$  is excepted from the above  $[1, q]$ .
  - (e)  $\mathcal{B}$  computes other public values, and gets *params* and *gpk*.
- (3)  $\mathcal{B}$  gives *params*, *gpk*,  $ik = (\gamma, \{s_j\}_{att_j \in Att})$  and  $ok = (z)$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

In Join queries,  $\mathcal{A}$  knows  $(A_i, x_i)$  ( $i = 1, \dots, q$ ) because  $\mathcal{A}$  plays the role of corrupted *GM*. However,  $\mathcal{A}$  cannot know secret keys of honest users  $y_i$  ( $i = 1, \dots, n$ ). For Signing queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  makes a group signature by using  $(A_i, x_i, y_i)$ , and returns this signature. If  $d = 1$  and  $i = i^*$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  aborts. For Corruption queries,  $\mathcal{B}$  answers  $y_i$ . If  $d = 1$  and  $i = i^*$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  aborts. Re-BuildTree queries are the same as the proof of anonymity. Finally,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs the valid group signature for honest user  $U_k$ . We can get the member certificate  $(A^*, x^*, y^*)$  by using the same technique as for Traceability. We define a Type 1 Adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , which is the case of  $A^* = A_k \in \{A_i\}_{i=1}^n$  and  $x^* \neq x_k$ . We define a Type 2 Adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , which is the case of  $(A^*, x^*) = (A_k, x_k)$ .

- In the case of Type 1 : If  $d \neq 0$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  aborts. Otherwise  $A^* = (g_1 E^{y^*})^{\frac{1}{x^* + \gamma}} = (g_1^{1+z\xi y^*})^{\frac{1}{x^* + \gamma}}$  holds.  $A^* = A_k = (g_1 E^{y_k})^{\frac{1}{x_k + \gamma}} = (g_1^{1+z\xi y_k})^{\frac{1}{x_k + \gamma}}$  holds. Therefore  $\mathcal{B}$  can compute  $\xi = \frac{x^* - x_k}{z\{y^*(x_k + \gamma) - y_k(x^* + \gamma)\}}$ .
- In the case of Type 2 : If  $d \neq 1$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  aborts. If  $k \neq i^*$ , then  $\mathcal{B}$  aborts. Otherwise,  $A^* = (g_1 E^{y^*})^{\frac{1}{x^* + \gamma}} = (g_1 g^{zy^*})^{\frac{1}{x^* + \gamma}}$  holds. Moreover,  $A^* = A_{i^*} = (g_1 E^{y_{i^*}})^{\frac{1}{x_{i^*} + \gamma}} = (g_1 g_3^{z\xi})^{\frac{1}{x_{i^*} + \gamma}}$  holds. Therefore  $\mathcal{B}$  can get  $\xi = y^*$ .

The advantage of  $\mathcal{B}$  is  $(1 - \frac{qsqH}{p})(\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{5} - \frac{8qH}{\eta 2^k})\epsilon + \frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{n}(\frac{1}{5} - \frac{8qH}{\eta 2^k})\epsilon) \geq \frac{1}{12}(1 + \frac{1}{n})(1 - \frac{qsqH}{p})\epsilon$ , since  $\eta > \frac{240qH}{2^k}$ .

Next, we give the proof of Theorem 4 as follows:

**Proof 4** We assume that  $\zeta_i = \{att_1, \dots, att_\phi\}$ , without limiting the generality of the foregoing. The equations used in our scheme to prove the knowledge of  $(\alpha, x_i, \tau, \delta)$  are as follows:

$$\frac{e(C_1, \omega)}{e(g_1, g_2)} = \frac{e(E, g_2)^\tau \cdot e(E, \omega)^\alpha}{e(C_1, g_2)^{x_i}} \quad (1)$$

$$C_2 = g_3^\alpha \quad (2)$$

$$C_3 = g_4^\alpha \quad (3)$$

$$C_4 = (CD)^\beta \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} CT_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)}{e(C_1, v_r/g_d)} = \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} \hat{h}_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)^\delta}{e(E, v_r/g_d)^\alpha} \quad (5)$$

In Eq.(1), a signer proves that  $C_1 = E^\alpha A_i$ , where  $A_i$  is a valid member certificate<sup>(14), (24)</sup>. Equations (2), (3) and (4) obviously holds. We can

change Eq.(5) into  $\frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} CT_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)}{e(E^\alpha A_i, v_r/g_d)} = \frac{e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} \hat{h}_j^{\Delta_j}, g_2)^\delta}{e(E, v_r/g_d)^\alpha}$ , since the validity of SPK  $C_1$  (namely (1)) has already been proven.  $e(\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} (\hat{h}_j^{-\delta} CT_j)^{\Delta_j}, g_2) =$

$e(A_i, v_r)e(A_i, g_d)^{-1} = e(A_i^{s_{T_r} - \sum_{d_j \in D_r^\zeta} \Delta_{d_j} s_{d_j}}, g_2)$  holds. We assume that  $\hat{h}_j^{-\delta} CT_j = A_i^{t_j}$ , where  $t_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ . Then

$$s_{T_r} = \sum_{att_j \in \zeta_i} \Delta_j t_j + \sum_{d_j \in D_r^{\zeta_i}} \Delta_{d_j} s_{d_j} \quad (6)$$

holds, since  $\prod_{att_j \in \zeta_i} (\hat{h}_j^{-\delta} CT_j)^{\Delta_j} = A_i^{\sum_{att_j \in \zeta_i} \Delta_j t_j}$ . If  $t_j = s_j$  ( $att_j \in \zeta_i$ ), then (6) obviously holds. On the contrary, we assume that  $t_j$  ( $att_j \in \zeta_i$ ) satisfies

**Table 1** Comparisons.

	Reference 18)	Reference 17)	Our Scheme
Dynamic property	no	no	yes
CCA-Anonymity	no	no	yes
Non-Frameability	no	no	yes
Key-Exposure	no	no	yes
Signature Length	$1633 + 171\phi$	$1192 + 1191\phi$	$1634 + 171\phi$
PK Length	$(m + 3) \mathbb{G}_1  + (m + 1) \mathbb{G}_2 $	$2 \mathbb{G}_1  +$	$(m + 3) \mathbb{G}_1  + (2m + 1) \mathbb{G}_2  + (m + 1) \mathbb{G}_2 $
User's SK Length	$ \mathbb{Z}_p  + (m' + 1) \mathbb{G}_1 $	$ \mathbb{Z}_p  + (m' + 1) \mathbb{G}_1 $	$2 \mathbb{Z}_p  + (m' + 1) \mathbb{G}_1 $
Signing	$(12 + 2\phi)\mathbb{G}_1 + 5\mathbb{G}_3 + e$	$(7 + 2\phi)\mathbb{G}_1 + (5 + \phi)\mathbb{G}_3 + (\phi + 1)e$	$(9 + 3\phi)\mathbb{G}_1 + (\phi + 1)\mathbb{G}_2 + 8\mathbb{G}_3 + 3e$
Verification	$12\mathbb{G}_1 + (\phi + 8)\mathbb{G}_3 + (\phi + 1)e$	$(6 + 2r)\mathbb{G}_1 + (8 + 2\phi)\mathbb{G}_3 + (\phi + 2r + 1)e$	$(11 + 2\phi)\mathbb{G}_1 + (\phi + 1)\mathbb{G}_2 + 14\mathbb{G}_3 + 6e$

(6). We set the values of  $s_{T_r}, \Delta_j, \Delta_{d_j}$  and  $s_{d_j}$  as constants. We randomly choose  $t_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, \phi - 1$ ), and set  $t_\phi := (s_{T_r} - \sum_{att_j \in \zeta_i \setminus \{att_\phi\}} \Delta_j t_j - \sum_{d_j \in D_r^{\zeta_i}} \Delta_{d_j} s_{d_j}) / \Delta_\phi$ . Then  $(t_1, \dots, t_\phi)$  satisfies (6). Therefore, the number of the solution vectors  $(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_\phi)$  is  $p^{\phi-1}$ . Therefore, the probability of the randomly chosen vector  $(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_\phi)$  satisfying (6) is  $p^{\phi-1} / p^\phi = 1/p$ . This implies that, the probability of a signature made by forged attribute certificates satisfying (6) is  $\frac{p^{\phi-1}-1}{p^\phi} = \frac{1}{p}(1 - \frac{1}{p^{\phi-1}})$ . Next, we consider  $t_j = s_j$  ( $j = 1, 2, \dots, \ell$ ), where  $\ell < \phi$ . Let  $\ell = \phi - 1$ , this means a signer has valid attribute certificates of  $\zeta_i \setminus \{att_\phi\}$ . We assume that a signature satisfies (5). Then  $t_\phi := (s_{T_r} - \sum_{att_j \in \zeta_i \setminus \{att_\phi\}} \Delta_j s_j - \sum_{d_j \in D_r^{\zeta_i}} \Delta_{d_j} s_{d_j}) / \Delta_\phi = s_\phi$  hold. This means that the signer has valid attribute certificates of  $\zeta_i$ , and the signature is not a forged signature. Therefore, we set  $\ell < \phi - 1$ . This means a signer has valid attribute certificates of  $\zeta_i \setminus \{att_{\ell+1}, \dots, att_\phi\}$ . Then there exist the number of  $p^{\phi-\ell-1} - 1$  pair  $(t_{\ell+1}, \dots, t_\phi)$  such that  $(s_1, \dots, s_\ell, t_{\ell+1}, \dots, t_\phi)$  satisfies (6) and  $(t_{\ell+1}, \dots, t_\phi) \neq (s_{\ell+1}, \dots, s_\phi)$ . The number of vectors  $(t_{\ell+1}, \dots, t_\phi)$  is  $p^{\phi-\ell}$ . Therefore, the probability of a signature made by valid attribute certificates of  $\zeta_i \setminus \{att_{\ell+1}, \dots, att_\phi\}$  and forged attribute certificates of  $\{att_{\ell+1}, \dots, att_\phi\}$  satisfying (6) is  $\frac{p^{\phi-\ell-1}-1}{p^{\phi-\ell}} = \frac{1}{p}(1 - \frac{1}{p^{\phi-\ell-1}}) \leq \frac{1}{p}$ .

So, a verifier can decide whether an anonymous signer has valid attribute certificates when a verifier is given a signature which satisfies (5).

Next, we give the proof of Theorem 5. The equations used in the proof are the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.

**Proof 5** Without loss of generality, we assume that  $U_0$  with  $\zeta_0$  and  $U_1$  with  $\zeta_1$  represent malicious participants.  $U_0$  and  $U_1$  attempt to make a valid signature associated with  $T_r$  which satisfies  $\zeta_0 \cup \zeta_1 \models T_r$ ,  $\zeta_0 \not\models T_r$  and  $\zeta_1 \not\models T_r$ . They can make the SPK of  $(\alpha, x_0, \tau, \delta)$  satisfy Eqs. (1) to (4) because they have a valid membership certificate  $A_0$ . Let  $\zeta_0 \cup \zeta_1 := \zeta \models T_r$ . We assume that  $A_0^t = A_1$ , where  $t \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \setminus \{1\}$ . Note that the probability of  $t = 1$  is negligible. Then, from (6),  $\sum_{att_j \in \zeta_0} \Delta_j s_j + \sum_{att_j \in \zeta_1} t \Delta_j s_j + \sum_{d_j \in D_r^{\zeta}} \Delta_{d_j} s_{d_j} \neq s_{T_r}$  holds since  $t \neq 1$ . This means that they cannot use  $\{T_{i_0, j}\}_{att_j \in \zeta_0}$  and  $\{T_{i_1, j}\}_{att_j \in \zeta_1}$  simultaneously. Even if they attempt to make forged attribute certificates, the probability of accepting a signature is negligible from Theorem 4.

## 5. Comparisons

In this section, we compare the efficiency of our proposed scheme with previous ABGS schemes<sup>(17), (18)</sup>. To the best of our knowledge, these are the only proposals for ABGS. Let  $\zeta$  ( $|\zeta| = \phi$ ) be the set of attributes which is associated with a signature,  $D_\zeta$  be the set of dummy nodes which is defined as  $\zeta$ , and  $|Att| = m$ . We evaluate  $|D_\zeta| = O(|Att|)$  and treat  $|D_\zeta| \approx |\zeta| = \phi$  in **Table 1**. Let  $m' \leq m$  be the number of attributes for each user. Actually,  $m'$  is different for each user. However, to simplify, we use the same notation  $m'$  to express the bit-length of a user's secret key. Let  $r$  be the number of revoked members<sup>(17)</sup>. We assume that the computational estimations are made according to NF06 scheme<sup>(24)</sup>, i.e., using MNT curves<sup>(23)</sup>. The prime number  $p$  is 170 bits, elements of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  are 171 bits, elements of  $\mathbb{G}_2$  are 513 bits, and elements of  $\mathbb{G}_3$  are 1020 bits. In our scheme,

although Signing costs are higher than that of a previous scheme<sup>18)</sup>, Verification costs are the lowest, because the number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes associated with a signature. There is room for argument regarding the Signing costs. Our scheme provides dynamic property, CCA-anonymity, key-exposure and Non-Frameability, which were not provided in the previous ABGSs.

## 6. Application of ABGS in Anonymous Survey for Collection of Attribute Statistics

In this section, we discuss how our ABGS can be applied to an anonymous survey for the collection of attribute statistics. An anonymous survey is used as follows: When we apply the GS to a business system offering some services to group members, each member's personal information is not exposed. A service provider can verify whether each user is valid or not. However, it is difficult for a service provider to obtain a collection of the user's attribute statistics to improve service contents. To apply an anonymous survey, a service provider can obtain a collection of user's attribute statistics without exposing each user's information. Although an anonymous attribute authentication scheme has been proposed<sup>29)</sup>, this scheme treats only one attribute on a single authentication execution. This means the relationships among some attributes, e.g., (female  $\wedge$  20s), cannot be handled in the statistical information. An anonymous survey which is a protocol executed among trusted third parties (TTPs) has been proposed<sup>30)</sup>. Each TTP is associated with one attribute. A user with some attributes sends the distributor a ciphertext encrypted with the public key of the TTP who is in charge of user's attribute type. The distributor can obtain the statistics of attributes without any other information to execute this protocol. The relationships among some attributes can be handled in the statistical information. However, a distributor cannot verify whether users properly construct the ciphertext or not. An anonymous survey which is a protocol using the **Open** algorithm of Ateniese, et al. GS<sup>2)</sup> has been proposed<sup>25)</sup>. A distributor can verify whether users properly make the ciphertext or not, to verify the validity of group signatures. In the NS03 scheme<sup>25)</sup>, each user has attribute certificates which are used for making a group signature. The distributor executes the **Open** algorithm to reveal the signer's

attribute type. Because one attribute certificate is issued for an attribute type, it is difficult for the relationships among some attributes to be handled in the statistical information. There is an obvious solution: new attribute types such as  $att_C = att_A \wedge att_B$  are defined. However, the number of all attribute types are represented by  $O(2^m)$ , where  $m$  is the number of all attributes. We solve this attribute increase problem to apply an ABGS.

- (1) A user makes a group signature  $\sigma$  associated with the set of attributes  $\zeta$  to use our ABGS.
- (2) The user encrypts  $\zeta$  to use the public key of a distributor, and sends both  $\sigma$  and the encrypted  $\zeta$  to the distributor.
- (3) The distributor decrypts  $\zeta$ , and verifies whether  $\sigma$  is valid or not.
- (4) The statistical information is the collection of  $\zeta$ .

To collect the set of attributes  $\zeta$ , the distributor can obtain the statistics of attributes without any other information, because the distributor does not know the opening key which is used for the opening procedure to reveal the signer's identification from the group signature. The distributor can verify whether users properly made the ciphertext or not, to verify that the validity of group signatures is the same as in the NS03 scheme<sup>25)</sup>. The relationships among some attributes can be handled in the statistical information in the same way as in the SAKO96 scheme<sup>30)</sup>, without increasing the number of attribute certificates of each user. Indeed, the number of attribute certificates of each user is represented by  $O(m)$ . Of course, relationships among some attributes which one wants to reflect with the statistical information are different in each case. Our scheme is suitable for use in the anonymous survey because the change of relationships is indispensable in the anonymous survey for the collection of attribute statistics.

## 7. Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a dynamic ABGS scheme that enables an access tree to be changed. Our ABGS is efficient in that re-issuing of the attribute certificate previously issued for each user is not necessary. As minor contributions, our ABGS enables CCA-anonymity and key-exposure properties, and the number of calculations in a pairing does not depend on the number of attributes associated with a signature. A service provider obtains a collection of anonymous user's

attribute statistics to improve service contents by using our ABGS.

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