

IPv6 ベースの DNS クエリトラフィック解析

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概要: とある大学の DNS サーバにおける IPv6 ベースの DNS クエリパケットの流量について統計的解析を行ったところ、次の様な結果を得た。(1) IPv4 ベースのセキュリティインシデントとの同期や、(2) IPv6 のみを介してセキュリティスキャンの前準備をしている痕跡が見られた。これらの結果は、IPv6 についても IPv4 の場合と同様に、ネットワーク流量を監視する必要があることを示している。

Analysis of IPv6 Based DNS Query Traffic

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Abstract: We investigated statistically on the IPv6 source IP address-based DNS query traffic a university campus network through January 1st to December 31st, 2005. The results are summarized, as follows: (1) Several security incidents in the IPv6-based DNS query traffic can be observed in or synchronized with the IPv4-based DNS query one like a mass mailing worm (MMW)- or spamming from the bot worm (BW)-infected PC terminals, and (2) we can also find a suspicious IPv6 based PTR resource record (RR) based DNS query traffic like a typical reverse domain resolution access in preparation for the next security scanning. Therefore, it can be clear that we should pay much attention not only IPv4 address based packet traffic but also IPv6 address based one when detecting the security incident in the campus or enterprise network system.

1. Introduction

It is of considerable importance to keep security of a domain name system (DNS) server in the information and communication technology (ICT)-based societies since the almost network application strongly depends on the domain name resolution services at their initial stages like, for example, a host domain name for a web site in the Web browser (a standard name resolution), the IP addresses of the PC clients for several network application servers (a reverse name resolution), and a host domain name of the E-mail servers by a simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP; E-mail) server daemon program (a mail exchange name resolution).

The DNS service is requested by DNS clients with a DNS query packet such as A (Address),

PTR (Pointer), or MX (mail exchange) record based UDP packet mainly and they correspond to standard, reverse, and mail exchange name resolution accesses, respectively. If the DNS stops, the almost the network applications will crash. One of the attractive solutions to keep security of the DNS server is to employ an intrusion detection system (IDS).¹⁻⁵

The IDS surely provides a plenty of useful alert messages, however, it provides too much alert ones to analyze in real time (false positive or negative). In order to develop a new useful IDS/IPS against future remote attack on the DNS server, it is of considerable importance to get more detailed information for access traffic of network applications like DNS query packets between a DNS

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


Figure 1. Traffic of the DNS query packets to the top domain DNS server (**tDNS**) and the traffic from the inside- and the outside-DNS clients in a university through January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2005 (day^{-1} unit).




Figure 2. A schematic diagram of a network observed in the present study.

server and its DNS clients.

Recently, we observed traffic of the DNS query packets that have an IPv6 based source IP address in the top domain name system (**tDNS**) server of a university (Figure 1). Interestingly, the total traffic is mainly driven by the traffic from the outside of the university and several peaks can be found in Figure 1. These peaks are categorized into three groups. The first is a peak at April 20th, 2005, the second is a peak for August 30th, 2005, and the last is a group for April 20th, August 5th, September 28th, October 13th, and December 10th, 2005.

The present paper discusses on the abnormal IPv6 address based DNS query traffic consisting of (1) the A and PTR records based DNS query

packets at April 20th, 2005, (2) the PTR record based DNS query packets at August 30th, 2005, and (3) the A record based DNS query packets at August 5th, September 28th, October 13th, and December 10th, 2005 (see Figure 1).

2. Observations

2.1 Network System

We investigated traffic of the IPv4/IPv6 address based DNS query access between the top domain DNS server (**tDNS**) and the DNS clients. Figure 2 shows an observed network system in the present study, an optional configuration of the BIND-9.2.6 server program daemon in **tDNS**, the structure of syslog messages, and the three typical DNS query types. The DNS server, **tDNS**, is one of the top level DNS (kumamoto-u) servers and plays an important role of domain name resolution and subdomain delegation services for many PC clients and the subdomain network servers in the university, respectively, and the operating system is Linux OS and is currently employed kernel-2.4.33.

2.2 Capture of DNS Query Packets

In **tDNS**, BIND-9.2.6 program package has been employed as a DNS server daemon.⁷ The DNS query packets and their contents have been captured and decoded by a query logging option (Figure 2, see in more detail). The log of DNS query access has been recorded in the syslog files. All the syslog files are daily updated by the crond system. The line of syslog message mainly consists of the content of DNS query packet like a fully qualified domain name (an A resource record (RR) type), an IP address (a PTR RR type), and a mail exchange (an MX RR type).

3. Results and Discussion

3.1 IPv6 based DNS Query Traffic

We observed traffic of IPv6 source IP address-based DNS query packet from DNS clients in the outside the university to the top domain DNS server (**tDNS**) through January 1st to December




Figure 3. Traffic of the DNS query packet access from the outside of the campus network through January 1st to December 31st, 2005 (day^{-1} unit).




Figure 4. Total IPv6 and IPv4 based DNS query traffic from the outside of the campus network through January 1st to December 31st, 2005 (day^{-1} unit).

31st, 2005 (Figure 3). In Figure 3, the A and PTR resource records (RRs) based DNS query traffic curves change weekly within averaged values of ca. 400 and 270 packet/day, respectively, and the MX RR based DNS query traffic curve keeps almost the same value of ca. 20 packet/day. In Figure 3, we can find several interesting peaks of (i) April 20th, (ii) August 5th, (iii) August 30th, (iv) September 28th, (v) October 13th, and (vi) December 10th, 2005.

In the first peak (i), the both traffic curves of the A and PTR RRs based DNS query packets changes simultaneously and the total DNS query traffic from the outside university is dominated by the both A and PTR RRs based DNS query packet traffics. In the other peaks (i)-(vi), we can observe the traffic curves are mainly driven by the A RR based DNS query packet traffic ones. Exceptionally, the third peak (iii) is mainly contributed




Figure 5. Total DNS query traffic from the outside of the university vs. DNS query traffic of four query contents (April 20th, 2005, s^{-1} unit)

by the PTR RR based DNS query packet traffic. Therefore, the peaks (i)-(vi) should be categorized into three groups, as follows: (1) The first group consists of (i), (2) the second group is assigned to (iii), and (3) the third group includes (ii), (iv), (v) and (vi). Therefore, we investigated furthermore on the three groups.

3.2 A and PTR RR based DNS query Traffic

Firstly, we illustrate the observed IPv4/IPv6 address based DNS query packet traffic between the top domain DNS server (**tDNS**) and the DNS clients from the outside the university in Figure 4 through January 1st to December 31st, 2005. In Figure 4, we can find a couple of peaks at April 20th, 2005, in the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses based DNS query traffic curves. The both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses based DNS query traffic consist of the A and PTR resource records (RRs) based DNS query packets (see Figure 3). Unexpectedly, we failed statistically to find out the suspicious source IP addresses of the abnormal DNS query traffic at April 20th, 2005, and then we noticed that the abnormal traffic would be a large-scale IP address distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.

We can also demonstrate statistics of the contents for the A and PTR record based DNS query traffic at April 20th, 2005. the top-four keywords for query contents are shown as below,

DNS query contents	IPv4	IPv6
*****.**.kumamoto-u.ac.jp	230,729	1,345
133.95.***.**	216,798	265
***.**.kumamoto-u.ac.jp	180,298	999
133.95.***.**	152,548	377




Figure 6. Total DNS query traffic from the outside of the university vs. DNS query traffic of four query contents (April 20th, 2005, s^{-1} unit)

Interestingly, the same keywords can be observed in the top keywords for query contents of the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses based DNS query traffics. The four keywords are related with two fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) of a subdomain E-mail server and the top domain DNS (**tDNS**) server, respectively, and the other two different IP addresses in the subdomain.

In order to confirm this result, we performed Figures 5A and 5B show regression analysis on the total traffic of the DNS query packets from the outside of the campus network versus the traffic of the A and PTR records based DNS query packets including the four keywords. The data are April 20th, 2005. In Figures 5A and 5B, the correlation coefficients of the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses based DNS traffics (R^2) are calculated to be 0.949 and 0.890, respectively. This also means that the total DNS query traffic from the outside of the campus network considerably correlates to the traffic of the A and PTR records based DNS query packets including the four keywords at April 20th, 2005. Fortunately, the fact of this abnormal A and PTR records based DNS query traffic can be easily understood since we have received a lot of spam relay or claiming E-mails probably generated automatically and/or manually by the spam check filter or the manager of E-mail servers in the internet and we have also found the same subdomain name, FQDNs, and IP addresses of the four keywords in the E-mails.

3.3 Suspicious PTR RR based DNS query Traffic

We observed the abnormal IPv6 address based traffic of the DNS query packets from the outside of the university to the top domain DNS server through the day of August 30th, 2005 (Figure 6). In Figure 6, the main traffic starts from 15:09 and almost ends after 15:19, i.e. it takes a short period of time, as only 10 minutes. Surprisingly, the IPv6 address based DNS query traffic takes a rate of 43,151 packet/day (the usual rate; ca. 700 packet/day). The traffic rate consists of the A, A6, AAAA, PTR, MX, and TXT records based DNS query traffic ones of 257, 109, 75, 42,659, 47, and 4 packet/day, respectively. This feature indicates that the abnormal DNS query traffic is surely driven by the PTR record based DNS query traffic

The top two DNS query access clients can be found, as follows,

DNS query contents	IPv4	IPv6
*****.**.kumamoto-u.ac.jp	230,729	1,345
133.95.***.**	216,798	265
***.**.kumamoto-u.ac.jp	180,298	999
133.95.***.**	152,548	377

We can also detect the IP addresses of the university (from 133.95.0.0 to 133.95.255.255) in the query contents of the abnormal PTR record based DNS query packet traffic. As a result, it can be clearly said that the abnormal PTR record based DNS query packet traffic is generated as the pre-scanning and/or pre-investigation to search the next victim PC clients in the university before security attack against the campus network.

3.4 DNS Query Traffic of Spam Bots

We can demonstrate statistics of the query contents for the A resource record (RR) based DNS query packets in the IPv6 address based DNS traffic from the outside of the university through the day of August 5th, 2005, shown in Figure 6A. In Figure 7, several interesting six keywords of “mx”, “ns”, “mail”, “gate”, “smtp”, and “relay”, are found. The six keywords are typically included

	1	2	3	4	5				
m	1041	mx	682	mai	339	mail	339	gate.	233
q	285	ma	345	gat	233	gate	233	relay	207
n	222	ga	259	mx.	231	mxl.	226	mail1	194
r	207	ns	215	mxl	226	mxs.	225	smtp.	172
s	202	re	207	mxs	225	rela	207	mail.	145
k	114	sm	172	ns.	215	smtp	172	kun.k	73
h	51	ku	111	rel	207	kun.	73	hpx.m	51
w	36	hp	51	smt	172	hpx.	51	kuc-	32
a	24	ww	35	kun	73	kudc	32	mxs.a	27

Figure 7. Statistics of the contents for the A resource record based DNS query packets from the client A at August 5th, 2005.




Figure 8. Total DNS query traffic from the outside of the university vs. DNS query traffic of four query contents at August 5th, September 28th, October 13th, and December 10th, 2005(s⁻¹ unit)

in the DNS query packets that are transmitted from a mass mailing worm (MMW) and/or a bot worm (BW)-infected PC clients, such as W32/Mydoom MMW, W32/Mytob BW, and/or several W32/Zotob BW variants. Musashi et al. reported that the W32/Mydoom MMW and the W32/Mytob BW transmit the A record DNS query packets when attacking on the next vulnerable victim PC terminals.⁸

Figures 8A-8D show regression analysis on the total traffic of the A RR based DNS query packets versus the traffic of the A RR based DNS query packets including the six keywords. The data are August 5th, September 28th, October 13th, and December 10th, 2005. In Figures 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D, the correlation coefficients (R²) are calculated to be 0.953, 0.979, 0.988, and 0.994, respectively.

This also means that the total traffic of the A record based DNS query packets correlates that of the A record based DNS query packets including the six keywords.

As a result, it is clear that the abnormal A RR DNS query traffic in the days of August 5th, September 28th, October 13th, and December 10th, 2005, are mainly transmitted from the PC clients infected with the W32/Mydoom MMW, or W32/Mytob and W32/Zotob BW variants.

4. Concluding Remarks

We statistically investigated syslog files in the top domain DNS server (tDNS) in a university when observing abnormal IPv6 address based traffic of DNS query packets. These abnormal traffic are categorized with the following three types: (1) First is abnormal traffic of the A and PTR records based DNS query packets including the four keywords, (2) Second is abnormal traffic of the PTR record based DNS query packets that include the IP addresses in the university, and (3) Last is the abnormal traffic of the A record based DNS query packets including the six keywords that related to a simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) engine of the mass mailing worm (MMW) and/or a bot worm (BW). From these results, we should pay much attention on the IPv6 address based DNS query packets that can be used to evade a detection system and implement this first knowledge in the IDS of our University as a first step of a future study.

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